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Abstract 
 
This thesis traces asexuality genealogically through a series of thematically organised 
case studies by mapping ‘asexuality’ between late 19th and 21st century medical and 
psychological works and socio-political movements. By problematizing existing works 
surrounding asexuality and their definitions, the thesis argues that asexuality has been 
placed under erasure by Western capitalist societies that have understood sex as a 
consumer object, and rendered asexuality or a ‘lack’ of consumption of (hetero)sex, as 
characteristic of ‘bad economic subjects’. The research draws on Foucauldian (2003) 
genealogy to illuminate ignored or erased historical instances of asexuality in relation to 
specific socio-political contexts. My themes of medicalization, pathologization and 
politicization are understood as Deleuzian (1987) assemblages, with asexuality being a 
trace of a node within these assemblages. The thesis argues that asexuality is in fact not 
definable at all, and that rather than defining what asexuality may or may not be, it is 
instead more useful to consider how the heterogeneity of asexuality might challenge 
broader understandings of sexuality in Western society. Through Deleuzian (1987) 
theories of the assemblage, asexuality is understood as something with an agency of its 
own, which moves through the assemblages of medicalization, pathologization and 
politicization interacting with other nodes and changing the shape of both the 
assemblage and asexuality itself. The work therefore provides grounding for potential 
future studies on invisibility, asexual ontology, and the range of ‘new’ emerging sexual 
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Introduction 
	  
The Asexuality Visibility and Education Network (AVEN) and its forums form an online 
community of self-identified ‘asexuals’. The Asexuality Visibility and Education 
Network was established in 2002 by college student David Jay after he reported 
struggling significantly in coming to his own identity as an asexual due to a lack of 
information and understanding around what asexuality might be (Mosbergen 2013). In 
recent years a growing field of asexuality studies has begun to emerge, alongside the 
online asexual community. However, as yet there is no research that has documented 
‘asexuality’ prior to the Internet. Existing works on asexuality (see Carrigan 2011, 
Przybylo 2012, Scott and Dawson 2015, Scherrer 2008) have either understood 
asexuality purely discursively, or focused their attention on the contemporary asexual 
community through recruiting participants from the Asexuality Visibility and Education 
Network or analysing its forums. Przybylo and Cooper (2014) have argued for the 
development of a queer archive of asexuality, but as yet there has been no work 
published in response to this. There have been limited explorations of asexuality in 
historical medical contexts (for example see Przybylo’s (2012) work around the 
‘scientific’ study of asexuality) but as yet there has been no work that maps asexuality 
historically throughout a range of situated contexts. 
 
My research therefore seeks to trace asexuality historically through themes of 
medicalization, pathologization and politicization. In doing so, I draw together a series 
of case studies that map asexuality across different epistemes to examine the ways in 
which Western sex-centric society and ‘normative’ standards of sex have erased 
asexuality. I use my methodology chapter as an opportunity to explore how ‘normative’ 
sexuality has been constructed in Western society, before turning to my analysis to 
discuss how these conceptualisations of ‘normative’ sexuality have influenced the 
(in)visibility of asexuality. I argue that asexuality is not merely a product of web 2.0, 
but rather the Asexuality Visibility and Education Network can be considered a 
contemporary version of historic discourses in a broader becoming of ‘asexuality’. I 
map asexuality throughout historical texts through the lens of my themes, paying 
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attention to the absences and silences within these historical texts to illuminate historic 
instances or moments of what may be read as asexuality. 
 
In researching asexuality I pay specific attention to the methodological considerations 
necessary for my research. In my methodology chapter I problematize existing works on 
asexuality, and the definitions they give. I address the ontological complications of how 
we can research an object that is claimed to be socially or culturally invisible and how 
we can research an object that is only understood to exist as a ‘lack’ or an ‘absence’ of 
something else. Etymologically ‘asexuality’ has documented instances as far back at the 
19th century, where it was used in biological works to describe ‘missing’ sex organs, a 
definition also taken up by Krafft-Ebing (1886), whose work I examine in Chapter 3. 
The use of ‘asexuality’ has evolved somewhat since the 19th century; the prefix ‘a-’ is 
used commonly in the English language to communicate a ‘without’ or ‘lack’, hence a-
sexuality has come to be framed in Western society as a ‘lack’ of sexuality. In order to 
work around the problematic nature of defining asexuality through a ‘lack’ of sexuality, 
I take up the work of Browne and Nash (2010). Using the work of Browne and Nash 
(2010) I argue that defining asexuality would dilute its political potential. Drawing on 
theorizing from Halperin (2009), I suggest that asexuality cannot be defined and 
propose that rather than defining asexuality it is instead more useful to look at the 
heterogeneity and complexity in its definition to consider how this might challenge 
Western understandings of sexuality more broadly.  
 
My methodology chapter also outlines how my theoretical framework has been 
constructed, and the ways in which I deploy my methodology. I take a Foucauldian 
genealogical approach to my research in order to illuminate historical instances of 
asexuality that have remained unspoken, ignored or erased. I do so through a series of 
case studies which are examined in relation to their contexts, rather than aside from 
them, to highlight the ways in which asexuality has been constructed as invisible. In 
doing so I draw on Mazzei (2007) to examine how I might pay attention to the silences 
present in history and come to understand them as purposeful. I argue that listening to 
silences might enable us to disturb the taken-for-granted histories we are told, and 
reveal the heterogeneity of asexuality and its history. In listening to silences my 
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methodological approach draws on elements of Derridian (1997, 1993, 1976) thinking 
to conceptualise the silence of asexuality in Western histories as an absent presence. 
Using the work of Gordon (2011, 2008) and Cvetkovich (2003) I use my methodology 
chapter to consider how asexuality can be thought of as being haunted by historical 
traces. I combine multiple theoretical perspectives to build a methodological “tool box” 
(Foucault 1974: 523); through my approach I produce a multi-stranded analysis of the 
complexity of asexuality.  
 
I further expand my theoretical framework to understand the themes my case studies are 
organized around as assemblages, enabling a reading of asexuality as something with an 
agency of its own, which moves as a trace of a node through assemblages, interacting 
with other nodes, and changing the shape of both the assemblage and itself. In drawing 
on Deleuze and Guattari (1987) I enable a focus on what asexuality can become as 
opposed to what it is or is not. Through a focus on what asexuality can become I explore 
the relationships between asexuality and other nodes within the assemblages of 
medicalization, pathologization and politicization, analysing how the trace of the node 
of asexuality is constantly drawn into territory’s of other nodes, changing the shape and 
value of both. I recognise the limitations of my work in terms of scope, and offer 
justification to the inclusion of my selected case studies, which map genealogically the 
history of asexuality and its invisibility.   
 
In my second chapter I explore the medicalization assemblage in order to deconstruct 
historic medical works and their specific socio-historic contexts. This chapter negotiates 
the ways in which the medicalization of mundane experiences, such as pregnancy, food 
habits, balding or sex became pathologized through the binary separation of 
body/identity. I focus on the vast range of ‘cures’ proposed to treat ‘hysteria’ and 
‘frigidity’ in the late 19th and early 20th Century, examining the ways in which a ‘lack’ 
or ‘absence’ of female orgasm came to be regarded as abnormal and in need of cure. I 
consider how the rise of enlightenment thinking alongside the eugenics and feminist 
movements enabled the cultural production of ‘hysteria’ and ‘frigidity’ and facilitated 
the definition of ‘scientific’ ideals of ‘normative’ sexuality. Maines’ (1999) 
documentation of the medicalization of female sexuality is used as the basis for my 
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initial case studies which analyse the ‘cures’ used to treat female ‘hysteria’ or 
‘frigidity’, ranging from hydrotherapy to vibrators. The second case study provides an 
exploration of Viagra, and its associated conceptual evolution from the physiological 
cures of the late 19th and early 20th Century. I examine the ways in which capitalism and 
constructs of hegemonic masculinity have enabled the cementation of Viagra as a 
cultural icon. I highlight the ways in which asexuality is further erased through the 
framing of a ‘lack’ of sexual desire as problem in need of a cure, and explore how 
capitalist Western society has erased asexuals as ‘bad economic subjects’ due to their 
refusal to consumer (hetero)normative sex, and medical ‘cures’ such as Viagra 
(Lazzarato 2009).  
 
 
In my third chapter I then turn to case studies of the works of Krafft-Ebing (1886), 
Kinsey (1948, 1953) and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (America Psychiatric 
Association 2013, 1994, 1987, 1980) to explore the pathologization assemblage. In this 
chapter I trace the categorization of an ‘absence’ or ‘lack’ of sexual desire as 
‘psychiatric conditions’. I examine the invisibility of asexuality through the psyche, 
exploring the ways in which psychological works framed sexual desire as a necessity 
for ‘healthy’ mental functioning. I draw on the work of Krafft-Ebing (1886) as the basis 
for my first case study in this chapter, as one of the earliest Western works to name 
asexuality (despite the difference in definition to contemporary understandings); I pay 
particular attention to Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) exploration of instances of ‘lack’ or 
‘absence’ of sexual desire. I analyse the field notes of Krafft-Ebing (1886) and his case 
studies of patients, drawing attention to the ways in which Darwinism and its promotion 
of biological essentialism, in combination with remaining traces of religion, influenced 
Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) understandings of ‘normative’ sexuality. I then turn to the 
controversial works of Kinsey (1948, 1953) to examine his privileging of physical 
response in his categorization of patients’ sexuality. I underline the mid-20th Century 
trend in behaviourism as contributing to Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) categorization of 
patients in accordance with their accounts of physical sexual response.  
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Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) work categorized patients who he deemed to recall ‘low’ sexual 
response as ‘X’, a category he then excluded from his chart and neglected to analyse, 
despite recording it in his tables. I argue that Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) ‘X’ patients become 
an absent presence of asexuality in his works. Given the dominance of psychoanalytic 
modes of thinking, research into sexuality became a growth area, and so with it a range 
of other researchers began to explore different psychosexual categories, which show a 
preference for heteronormative and heteropenetrative modes of sexual desire (see Freud 
1951, Freud 1914, Lacan et al. 1982). Finally in my study of the pathologization 
assemblage I turn to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual to examine how historical 
texts have continued to haunt contemporary lived experiences and categorizations of a 
‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of sexual desire. I pay specific attention to the associated discourses 
that equated techno-science to progress, resulting in a shift in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual’s rationale away from psychoanalytic frameworks and towards bio-
medical models grounded in ‘science’. I explore the ways in which Foucault’s (1989, 
1977) discussion of mental health professions as part of a broader ‘psy-complex’ (Rose 
1999) demonstrate how the categorizations presented by the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual have enabled the creation of a self-regulatory society. I argue that through its 
numerous revisions the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual has refused to legitimize 
asexuality, despite pathologizing asexual practices and experiences, and in doing so it 
has further marginalized asexuality.  
 
In my fourth chapter I investigate the absent presence of asexuality within the 
politicization assemblage. I draw on the works of Plummer (1995) and Hemmings 
(2005) to provide a groundwork and exploration of how stories of various social and 
political movements have come to be told and remembered as linear, homogeneous and 
cohesive narratives of progress. Through my case studies I seek to highlight the 
fragmentation and heterogeneity present in social movements. I draw on case studies of 
the Gay Activists Alliance and feminist movements to highlight the erasure of 
asexuality from their histories before turning to a case study of the Asexuality Visibility 
and Education Network to examine how stories of liberation have shaped the 
contemporary asexual community and asexual activism.  
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I conclude by summarising the ways in which asexuality can be mapped across late 19th 
to 21st century medical and psychological work and histories of social movements. I 
argue that asexuality has been rendered invisible in capitalist Western society by 
discourses that frame the non-consumption of sex as a characteristic of a ‘bad economic 
subject’. I draw attention to the discourses throughout late 19th, 20th and 21st century 
histories that have continued to erase asexuality. I argue that this work can be 
considered grounding for wider studies on invisibility, asexual ontology, and the 
increasing number of sexual subjectivities that have been largely understood to be a 
product of Web 2.0 and networked societies.   
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1. Methodology	  
1.1 Introduction	  
My research employs a genealogical approach, tracing asexuality historically through a 
series of thematically organised case studies based around themes of medicalization, 
pathologization and politicization. The case studies identified provide an exploration of 
silences surrounding sexual desire and attraction. I turn to silence and invisibility to 
provide an alternative account of what we might take asexuality to be without relying 
on typical historical accounts that have marginalized or erased asexuality so far. 
Previous works surrounding asexuality have employed a multitude of often-
contradictory definitions that can be considered problematic both within the asexual 
community and to those researching the field. As a Trans identified researcher who 
rejects the binary and preclusive medically essentialist definitions of both sexuality and 
gender embraced by Western society, I find existing definitions of asexuality to be 
restrictive and feel that they fail to take account of the complexity and multiplicity of 
asexual identities.  
 
Asexuality is often understood as the trace of Western understandings of sexuality 
through its positioning as being in binary opposition to sexuality, or as a ‘lack’ or 
‘absence’ of ‘normative’ sexuality (Przybylo 2011). Barker (2011: 34) argues that “we 
live in a sex-saturated culture”, but that “alongside…hypersexualisation there is an 
ever-increasing anxiety about sex and a concern with being unable to have ‘functional’ 
[or ‘normative’] sex”. Conceptualisations of ‘normative’ sexuality in Western society 
hinge on Western constructs of gender as a biologically innate and binary category; in 
Western society ‘normative’ sexuality has been framed as hetero-penetrative, taking 
place between a ‘man’ and ‘woman’, and resulting in (male) orgasm (Barker 2013). 
‘Normative’ Western sexuality privileges masculinity, understanding the male as active, 
and the female as passive, during ‘normative’ intercourse. Male orgasm, achieved 
through penile-vagina penetration, is positioned as the ultimate goal of ‘normative’ sex 
(Barker 2011, Barker and Richards 2013, Denman 2004). Western standards of sexual 
normativity also rely on a linear progression of sexual intercourse, beginning with 
sexual desire, followed by sexual arousal and concluding with (male) orgasm (Barker 
2011, Denman 2004). The linear model of sexuality frames all forms of sexual pleasure 
	   8	  
outside of it as pathological, dysfunctional or abnormal, and also assumes sexual desire 
is universally experienced. Forms of sexuality outside of hetero-penetrative frameworks 
are frequently compared and measured against heterosexuality, and invariably 
understood as structured around gender (Barker and Richards 2013). As Barker (2013: 
69) has written, asexuality “questions the number one rule that we currently have about 
sex: that it is a vitally important defining feature of relationships”. Asexuality also 
questions constructs of sexuality as reliant on gender and sex as being essential to 
‘healthy’ relationships. Mainstream media and self-help cultures contribute to 
representations of sex as necessary for ‘healthy’ relationships, with thousands of print 
and web-based magazines dedicating pages to how to maintain ‘healthy’ relationships; 
their ‘answers’ nearly always revolve around sex (See Ratchford et al.’s (2015) 
discussions in Cosmo, The Telegraph (2015) and Women’s Health Magazine (2015)). 
Boynton’s (2015) article in The Telegraph suggests a ‘lack’ of sex in a relationship 
must be addressed either through counselling, separation, or an open relationship 
(enabling one or both partners to have sex with others). Whilst in some respects we can 
consider Boynton’s (2015) response as progressive, as it suggests alternative 
relationship models outside of monogamy, it also renders non-sexual relationships as 
inherently ‘unhealthy’, by privileging sexual contact above all other forms of 
engagement in the relationship. It is perhaps because of the ways asexuality troubles 
‘normative’ Western understandings of sex and ‘healthy’ relationships that it has been 
rendered as preclusive to or outside of sexuality more broadly.  
 
My research traces the ways in which discourses have positioned asexuality as being 
preclusive to or outside of sexuality. Contemporary accounts of asexuality have noted 
that there has been a continued emphasis by activists in the asexual community on the 
recognition of asexuality as biologically innate and preclusive of other sexual identities 
(Scherrer 2008). I map the ways in which assemblages of medicalization, 
pathologization and politicization have contributed to the understanding that 
(a)sexuality must be visible, innate and biologically determined in order to be 
legitimized (Carrigan, Gupta and Morrison 2013, DeLuzio-Chasin 2011, Przybylo 
2011).  
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Therefore in contrast to existing works in the field my research avoids a fixed definition 
of asexuality, arguing that providing one would both exclude many self-defined 
asexuals and dilute the political potential asexuality can be said to harness as a refusal 
of Western sex-centric society’s standards of sexual normalcy (Carrigan 2011, Scherrer 
2008). In avoiding a fixed definition of asexuality I draw a comparison with work on 
bisexuality and queer definitions. I take Browne and Nash’s (2010) argument that to 
define ‘queer’ would dilute its resistant and transgressive potential as my starting point. 
As Halperin (2009: 454) has argued of bisexuality, rather than providing definitive 
lucidity around what bisexuality does or doesn’t mean, it is instead more useful to 
examine the “crisis of… definition” as productive for examining a more general and 
substantial “crisis in contemporary sexual definition”.  
 
In taking the same approach to my genealogical tracing of asexuality I attempt to 
complicate and examine the asexual “crisis of… definition” (Halperin 2009: 454) to 
provide a critique of the socio-political systems which have erased asexuality from 
traditional historical accounts. To do so, I employ elements of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1987) theory of the assemblage. For me, the assemblage refers to a number of non-
static, fluid and interconnecting objects or bodies within a shared context. I understand 
my themes as assemblages, each of which lacks definitive organization and finite 
structure, making them susceptible to change and development. Asexuality is 
understood as the trace of a node within the assemblages of medicalization, 
pathologization and politicization, moving through them with an agency of its own. 
This concept offers new understandings of asexuality, not as exclusive and oppositional 
to sexuality, but as something which has an agency of its own, moving through 
assemblages in constant flux, interacting simultaneously with socio-cultural contexts 
and power structures. I trace the historical operations and distributions of power 
thematically through assemblages of medicalization, pathologization and politicization 
drawing on the works of Foucault (2003) to disentangle discourses that have shaped 
contemporary asexuality (Currier 2003) and map the ways in which asexuality has been 
persistently erased from dominant historical narratives.  
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Despite rejecting a fixed definition of ‘asexuality’, I employ the term ‘asexuality’ as an 
analytic to critique histories that have privileged reproductive heterosexuality. 
Employing ‘asexuality’ as an analytic entails taking up the term ‘asexuality’ to critique 
historic accounts of (a)sexual practices. My approach avoids undue convolution and 
confusion in tracing asexual histories; it also illuminates erased instances of  (a)sexual 
practices, and offers a more nuanced understanding of what we might take ‘asexuality’ 
to mean, and how we might research it as the object of study. I am aware that using the 
term ‘asexuality’ as an analytic is both inadequate and necessary in my research 
(Derrida 1976). The inadequacy of using the word ‘asexuality’ as an analytic is made 
clear by Derrida’s (1976) work, which argued that written words contain ‘traces’ that 
convey meaning, but simultaneously ignore or overlook alternate meanings; language 
“can only be a failure, a gap; … since a word always points to an absence” (Frers 2013: 
433). However, using ‘asexuality’ as an analytic becomes necessary to ground the 
project in relation to wider socio-cultural constructions of sexuality. Given asexuality 
has been understood by Western societies as an ‘absence’ or ‘lack’ of normative 
sexuality, in exploring asexuality genealogically I have traced (at least some of) the 
absences present within historical works on sexuality.  
 
I do not define what an asexual identity category may or may not entail. However, in 
analysing asexuality genealogically I use these terms in an attempt to provide the 
foundation for my argument and prevent the discussion from becoming too abstract to 
offer any grounding for further research. Whilst genealogical enquiry is an abstraction 
in itself, I deploy genealogy in an effort to provide a basis for more productive and 
experience orientated research in the future by complicating contemporary reductive 
understandings of asexuality. In creating a historical account of asexual practices and 
experiences I illuminate previously erased or unspoken instances of what can be read as 
asexuality. I use the Deleuzian (1999) conceptualization of luminosity to describe the 
ways in which asexual histories come to exist as flashes, reflections or Derridian (1976) 
traces (Bogue and Spariosu 1994).  
 
In tracing asexuality genealogically I recognise that the decisions I make in including or 
excluding case studies shape what the research re-presents as asexual histories. In 
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highlighting instances of asexuality historically I provide accounts of asexuality to 
ground potential future investigations. I have focused my research around Western 
historical texts, whilst I recognise the restrictions and implications that result from this, 
it has also been necessary to narrow my focus in order to produce work of sufficient 
depth to do justice to the complexity of asexuality. I narrowed my research to Western 
texts to determine how they have shaped contemporary asexuality, as the majority of 
existing works surrounding contemporary asexuality (see Carrigan 2011, Przybylo 
2011, Scherrer 2008) focus on participants or data collected from the Asexual Visibility 
and Education Network forums, which are understood to be made up of largely 
Western, and indeed mostly American, members. There are a number of accounts of 
asexuality outside of white Western contexts emerging online via open and social media 
platforms (See ace-muslim (2015), Asexual People of Color (2015), and The Thinking 
Asexual (2015)), however due to scale, size and the risks of folding specified cultural 
and historical constructs into one overarching category, this project remains focused on 
compiling a – still always already selective - genealogical analysis of Western asexual 
ontology.  
 
Studying asexuality involves the negotiation of multiple ontological complexities. There 
are ontological difficulties as to how something claimed to be culturally and socially 
invisible can be researched; these difficulties are compounded when researching 
asexuality by contemporary Western understandings that recognise the object of my 
research only in relation to an absence or ‘lack’ of something else. For example, 
Bogaert (2012: 5) describes “real-deal” asexuality as having “a complete lack of sexual 
attraction and/or sexual interest”. Bogaert’s (2012, 2006, 2004) contemporary sexology 
work has understood asexuality only in relation to Western understandings of normative 
sexuality, and othered it as an intrinsic and amorphous category. From this perspective, 
‘lack’ entails uniformity. However, Bogaert’s (2012, 2006, 2004) work is contradicted 
empirically by the variety and multiplicity of identities put forward by the asexual 
community (Carrigan 2011). For example, the users of the Asexuality Visibility and 
Education Network forums (2015) are able to further categorize themselves by entering 
their own identification terms in a user information box that appears next to them when 
they post (see examples in Figure 1). The user information box allows space for user’s 
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to enter their Gender, Pronouns, Location and ‘A/sexuality’ (see examples in Figure 1). 
Identifications given are varied, diverse, and far beyond the restrictive medical 
essentialism of Bogaert (2012, 2006, 2004). My project seeks to avoid a fixed definition 
of asexuality, in order to prevent the exclusion of many self-identified asexuals whose 
identifications do not seem to fit into medically essentialist definitions of sexual 
orientation as biologically innate. Definitions of asexuality like Bogaert’s (2012, 2006, 
2004) are therefore problematic for my research as they deny individual agency and 








Figure 1. AVEN (2015) 
 
Przybylo (2011) asserts that asexuality should be conceptualized based on what it does 
rather than what it ‘lacks’. Building upon Przybylo’s (2011) work I contest that rather 
than understanding asexuality in line with contemporary Western understandings that 
situate asexuality as a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of something else, we should locate silences 
surrounding asexuality as “purpose full and meaning full” (Kim 2011, Mazzei 2007: 9). 
Asexual practices are understood as  
 
“neither fixed nor given, but as particular historical configurations of the 
material and immaterial captured and articulated through various assemblages 
which to some extend determine them as particular bodies, but never managed 
entirely to exclude the movement of differing and the possibility of becoming 
otherwise” (Currier 2003: 332). 
 
In order to conceptualise historical asexual practices, identities and communities I 
therefore turn to Deleuze and Guattari (1987) to reconceptualise asexuality. I place 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of 
the thesis can be viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
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emphasis on asexuality’s potential, and what it can become, rather than what asexuality 
is or is not. Through focusing on what asexuality can become I consider asexuality as 
the trace of a node within the assemblages of medicalization, pathologization and 
politicization (see page 19 for discussion of asexuality as the absent presence of the 
trace). In concentrating on what asexuality can become I enable an analysis of the 
processes of change that have placed asexuality under erasure within the assemblages of 
medicalization, pathologization and politicization (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, Derrida 
1976). I seek to illuminate the “historical configurations of the material and immaterial” 
(Currier 2003: 332) through genealogical enquiry, paying attention to the infinite 
variability and simultaneous restriction in the ways these historical configurations have 
shaped asexuality. From a Deleuzian (1987) perspective assemblages territorialize 
bodies, setting limits on what the body can do or become and determining the shape of 
sexuality (Fox 2012). Fox’s (2012) work, enables an understanding of asexuality as a 
fluid, ever-shifting entity, in constant flux; something which is both shaped by and 
shapes its context. Therefore, through my case studies I explore the ways that the 
assemblages of medicalization, pathologization and politicization have shaped 
asexuality, and the ways asexuality has shaped them. I use Deleuzian (1987) 
conceptualisations of territorialisation to demonstrate the simultaneous infinite 
variability and restrictiveness of sexuality (Fox and Alldred 2013). Another element of 
the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) I add to my ‘tool box’ of methodological ideas 
is the body without organs, which I understand as the way assemblages are embodied. 
The body without organs enables an understanding of contemporary asexuality as 
embodying the diverse and disparate nodes from the assemblages of medicalization, 
pathologization and politicization. Drawing on the concept of the body without organs, I 
pay attention to the ways in which asexual practices and embodiment can be understood 
as physically, politically and culturally emancipating from Western sex-centric society 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, Fox 2012).  
 
In the above subsection I have outlined how through genealogical analysis I examine 
the relations between assemblages of medicalization, pathologization and politicization 
with asexual practices and asexuality as an embodied identity category (Fox 2012). 
Turning to Deleuze and Guattari (1987) enables a radically different conceptualisation 
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of asexuality and its interconnections within complex historical assemblages and social 
practices; “refusing to subordinate the body to a unit of a homogeneity of the kind 
provided by the bodies subordination to… biological organizations” (Grosz 1994: 165). 
 
In the following subsection I now provide an in depth discussion of the methods and 
methodologies my research employs. I first turn to the works of Foucault (1980, 2003), 
Dean (1994) and Hook (2005) to explore how genealogy enables an alternative reading 
of asexual histories that draws upon silence as a subjugated knowledge. Following that, 
I consider what we might take invisibility to mean in relation to asexuality, and how we 
might research asexuality when it has been constructed as socially and culturally 
invisible. I argue that rather than a signifier of ‘absence’ or ‘lack’ moments of (a)sexual 
silence can be read as both transgressive and resistant and examine how the works of 
Cvetkovich (2003), Gordon (2008) and Mazzei (2007) will enable my research to move 
beyond definitions of asexuality as a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ to conceptualize what 
asexuality might become (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). 
 
1.2 Genealogy 
Though a genealogical tracing of asexuality, I seek to illuminate previously disguised, 
overlooked or unspoken instances of asexual practice. To achieve this I focus 
specifically on the invisible and the silent moments in sexual histories. Taking Foucault 
(2003: 8) as my starting point I employ genealogy to provide a re-presentation “of 
struggles and the raw memory of fights”. Foucauldian genealogy begins by de-
centralizing “power-effects” of institutions and dominant discourses that are often 
overlooked by ‘official’ histories (Foucault 2003: 9). Through employing a genealogical 
approach I highlight the climates that have constructed asexuality as an identity 
category that is considered only to exist through ‘absence’ (Foucault 2003, Hook 2005). 
In tracing the construction of the identity category of asexuality I deconstruct historical 
knowledges to underline the socio-political climates that have erased asexual practices. 
 
Genealogical analysis moves by attempting to illuminate subjugated accounts, in this 
instance of asexuality, to provide an alternative history (Hook 2005, Foucault 2003). 
The reactivation of historical climates considered alongside subjugated knowledges 
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disturbs the taken-for-granted ‘truths’ that have rendered asexuality invisible (Foucault 
2003, Hook 2005, Smart 1983). For example, Foucault’s (2003) genealogical analysis 
of sexuality sought to deconstruct historical discourses alongside individual cases 
studies and challenged the taken-for-granted narrative of, for example, Victorians as 
sexually repressed. I deliberately draw on the absences present within histories of 
(a)sexuality, because their subjugation has prevented their assimilation to dominant 
discourses and systems of institutional power (Hook 2005, Foucault 2003). Subjugated 
knowledges produce an “opposition and struggle” (Foucault 1980: 85) against totalizing 
‘truths’ and narratives of unity, generating a consciousness of the complexity and 
multiplicity of historical knowledges (Smart 1983).  
 
For Foucault (1980) genealogy is the union of two forms of subjugated knowledge; the 
first is that of the historical contexts that are obscured or masked within traditional 
histories, the second being local knowledges which have been dismissed as unqualified 
or ‘false’. It is through the union of these two forms of subjugated knowledge that a 
disturbance and disruption of dominant discourses is enabled. In accordance with 
Hook’s (2005: 4) claim that “genealogy might enable the project of political criticism” I 
use genealogical approaches to gain insight into the ways in which socio-political 
climates have affected the construction of asexuality, disturbing dominant discourses 
and exposing totalizing ‘truths’. For Foucault (1997: 256) the disturbance of totalizing 
‘truths’ gives us “something to do”. Foucault (1997: 256) argues that revealing the 
heterogeneity of history should lead “not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic 
activism”. The disruption of dominant discourses and the “hyper- and pessimistic 
activism” it enables renders genealogy ‘effective’ (Dean 1994). It is through the 
disturbance and critique of taken-for-granted scientific ‘truths’ that the heterogeneity of 
histories is revealed (Dean 1994, Hook 2005).   
 
The heterogeneity of discourses and histories are revealed through genealogy, making a 
‘one rule’ truth discourse difficult to hold onto. Whilst my genealogical tracing of 
asexuality seeks to provide a history of the present, it also necessarily rejects the present 
as an ‘end point’ (Foucault 1977). Drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept 
of the rhizome and Dean’s (2006) application of genealogy, my research maps 
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asexuality with no explicit beginning, end, or finality. Instead my case studies are 
organised thematically, each exploring complex medicalization, pathologization and 
politicization assemblages. Although I recognise the orderliness of writing these 
accounts, these assemblages are non-linear, and rendered infinitely variable by the 
agency that passes through them. I pay attention to the diverse and heterogeneous make-
up of my case studies within each assemblage, to avoid a linear and stagnant narrative 
of asexuality. I deliberately reject a teleological view of (a)sexuality, and apply a 
Deleuzian framework to Foucauldian conceptualisations of genealogy and power to 
fragment the cohesion of traditional accounts of (a)sexuality (Currier 2003). My 
research does not intend to provide an exhaustive history or genealogy of asexuality, 
rather it remains “always open to revision and extension” (Dean 2006: 217). I use case 
studies to complicate and critique conventional contemporary histories of asexuality 
that have erased, marginalized or ignored asexual identity or practices. And I document 
instances of (a)sexual practices in a way that troubles and disrupts previously recorded 
‘truths’ and ‘knowledges’, that have constructed asexuality as a product of an online 
Western networked society. In doing so I seek to underline the multiplicity of both 
asexuality, and the ways in which it has been erased and rendered an absent presence 
within the assemblages of medicalization, pathologization and politicization.  
 
For Foucault (1980), critiques enabled through genealogy’s refusal of assumed ‘truths’ 
and knowledges render genealogy ‘anti-science’; genealogies stand in opposition to 
dominant discourses and overarching narratives of ‘truth’. In opposing dominant 
discourses and narratives of truth genealogy becomes a “methodical problematization of 
the given” (Dean 2006: 216). Through genealogical investigation I problematize ‘the 
given’, examining the multi-stranded and complex ways in which asexual invisibility 
has been maintained through institutionalised systems and structures of power (Dean 
2006, Hook 2005). In exploring the maintenance of asexual invisibility through 
institutional structures of power, I provide grounding to further study in to the ways in 
which these have been taken up by society (Dean 2006, Hook 2005). Genealogy will 
facilitate the re-presentation of asexual histories, presenting a challenge and disruption 
to totalizing ‘truths’ (Hook 2005).  
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For Hook (2007: 138) genealogy is a “methodology of suspicion and critique” that 
should disrupt the familiar and taken-for-granted knowledges, and their production. 
Disruption of the familiar is made possible through the deconstruction of the previously 
unseen, or ignored, to provide a critique of totalizing ‘truths’ and the institutional power 
structures that underwrite them. The case studies that are drawn on seek to highlight the 
institutional power systems by which (a)sexual knowledge has been bound to its 
production. I examine not only subjugated knowledges, but also the cultural contexts 
that have enabled their subjugation, and the ways in which the dominant discourses at 
the time have been produced. In opposition to traditional histories I highlight the 
heterogeneity of (a)sexuality to deconstruct the sense of unity created and upheld by 
dominant discourses that have constructed asexuality invisible or present only through 
an ‘absence’ of something else (Bogaert 2006, Kim 2011, McNay 1994).  
 
The inclusion of subjugated knowledges in genealogical enquiry is vital due to the fact 
that they have not yet been assimilated into the ‘power-knowledge circuit’ (Ransom 
1997). Subjugated knowledges therefore harness the potential to be transgressive and 
disruptive, to illuminate previously unacknowledged trajectories, and to destabilise 
established dominant discourses (Hook 2007). However, Foucault (1980) highlights that 
the de-subjugation of knowledge is not without risk. The de-subjugation of knowledges 
renders them vulnerable to assimilation to dominant discourses and makes their 
adaption to disciplinary power structures possible. For example, the decriminalization 
of homosexuality significantly changed the shape of the gay liberation movement (for 
analysis of the gay liberation movement see Chapter 4 pages 63-70). With the 
decriminalization of homosexuality in Western society gay activists and political 
movement’s focus changed and began to push towards Western heteronormative ideals 
of the family and the good life (Ahmed 2010), eventually leading to the legalization of 
gay marriage in England and Wales in 2014. Whilst the legalisation of same sex 
marriage might initially seem unproblematic, homosexuality has been assimilated to 
Western norms and ideals, and has resulted in the further marginalization of certain 
sections of the community; legislation was passed under the banner of ‘equal marriage’, 
however many members of society remain ‘unequal’ in spite of this legislation such as 
those in non-monogamous relationships, those who do not want to be in relationships 
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and Trans individuals whose marriages must be annulled in order for them to obtain 
legal ‘gender recognition’. Therefore for Foucault (1980) the importance of maintaining 
a clear view of the purpose and objectives of genealogical investigation are paramount.  
 
In employing genealogy I seek to disrupt medical, pathological and political narratives 
of asexuality. In line with Smart (1983), I look to highlight the instability of historical 
knowledges and the conditions by which they are produced rather than seeking to 
replace these with new and secure foundations for knowledge. It is the purpose of my 
research to employ genealogy “to fragment the cohesion of objects” (Hook 2007: 144), 
in order that dominant narratives of asexuality as existing only through ‘lack’ may be 
challenged, and its construction illuminated. For Hook (2005, 2007), Foucault’s (1980, 
2003) genealogy is not directed towards the revelation of a specific ‘truth’, rather its 
purpose is to provide a critique. Conversely, May (1993) argues that the critique 
genealogy generates does in fact construct new forms of ‘truth’; through genealogical 
critique, new forms of knowledge are produced by the illumination of previously 
subjugated histories. However, in the case of asexuality there is a partial truth needed to 
move forward, and lay the groundwork for future research and activism. Truths 
generated by genealogy are not static, and are instead ‘action-directed’; genealogically 
produced knowledges harness the potential to transform traditional histories and the 
present (Hook 2007, May 1993). While I am aware of the pitfalls of genealogical 
enquiry, I employ it in an effort to transform “the relationship that we have with 
ourselves and our cultural universe” (Miller 1994: 211). It is the transformative 
potential that genealogical enquiry harnesses that enables the illumination of asexual 
histories that have been previously ignored or erased.  
 
Through genealogy I enable an analysis that takes account of how socio-political 
climates have facilitated the erasure of asexuality. I use genealogical enquiry to render 
visible the different dimensions of (a)sexuality, and to disturb notions of sexual desire 
as innate and ‘natural’ (Halperin 1995). Cvetkovich’s (2003) work presents an archive 
as a method of situating micro-contexts of the personal within a “broader landscape” of 
society, in line with this my genealogical analysis seeks to bring together previously 
dismissed “local” knowledges (Foucault 1980) with socio-political climates to uncover 
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the ways in which they have simultaneously functioned to erase or keep hidden 
asexuality.  
 
1.3 Invisibility, Silence and Haunting 
The difficulty of analysing a subject that cannot be seen, either through invisibility or 
through an existence only acknowledged through ‘absence’, makes asexuality 
particularly problematic for research. In his work surrounding the invisibility of 
whiteness Dyer (1997: 46) remarks “the subject seems to fall apart in your hands before 
you begin”. Heterosexuality can be considered synonymously to whiteness in this 
regard; the ‘given’ or ‘taken-for-granted’ becomes invisible through its normativity. In 
contrast, asexuality’s invisibility occurs through its opposition to the normative. 
Heteronormativity renders asexuality present, affective, yet invisible until verbalised. 
Asexuality can therefore be understood to “fall apart in your hands” (Dyer 1997: 46) as 
a strategy of Western sex-centric society. However, instead of examining the ways in 
which this falling apart may make it impossible to map sexuality, which would be a 
restrictive view on its history, the ‘absence’ might actually be considered a purposeful 
‘presence’ that enables a re-telling of asexuality. Derrida’s (1976) notion of the trace 
allows me to consider the ways in which the erasure of asexuality leaves in its place an 
‘absent presence’. In tracing asexuality I remain conscious that the ‘absent’ yet 
‘present’, invisible, or silent moments of history are unavoidably connected to the 
present, and affect the ways in which the future will be shaped (Black 2011). 
 
By giving equal value to the silences in my case studies as well as what is immediately 
visible, I “begin to hear the meanings dwelling within silence” (Johnson 2011: 59).  I 
draw upon the work of Mazzei (2007) to consider how the invisibility or ‘silence’ 
surrounding asexuality can be drawn upon as something that is productive rather than 
restricting. Mazzei (2007: 29) suggests exploring the silence as both “meaning full and 
purpose full” (emphasis in original). In turn I apply this to asexuality itself, arguing that 
rather than defining asexuality through ‘lack’ we should avoid a fixed definition and 
explore the trace left by its silence, in order that individuals may find their own meaning 
and purpose in asexuality.  
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To complement Mazzei’s (2007) work surrounding silences, I bring to the discussion 
Cvetkovich’s (2003) Archive of Feelings, which offers one approach of deconstructing 
historical knowledges. Cvetkovich (2003) uses oral histories, memoirs and memories to 
archive invisible histories, preserving the past and contextualising invisible traumas of 
the present. One such example is Cvetkovich’s construction of an archive of AIDS 
activism comprised of oral histories of lesbian AIDS activists, which serves “to keep the 
history of AIDS activism alive and part of the present” (Cvetkovich 2003: 6). As 
Gordon (2008: 195) argues, “to write a history of the present requires stretching toward 
the horizon of what cannot be seen with ordinary clarity yet”. The work of Gordon 
(2008) too therefore investigates the ways that invisibility can “haunt the present” 
(Cvetkovich 2003: 6), calling to attention to the political potential of invisibility enabled 
through the disturbed relationship between what is speakable and what is knowable in 
haunted categories such as asexuality (Scherrer 2008).  Kuntsman (2011: 5) summarises 
Cvetkovich’s (2003) work as “making the past matter” (emphasis in original), 
highlighting the particular usefulness of the archive to document histories that have 
been erased through political structures such as heteronormativity. Cvetkovich’s (2003) 
work can be used to further deconstruct the ways in which sex-centric Western society 
has further rendered instances of asexuality invisible, so that it can be said to haunt 
contemporary understandings of sexuality, thus creating asexuality’s critical and 
deconstructive potential. 
 
I deploy the work of Gordon (2008), Black (2011), and Cvetkovich (2003) as reference 
to consider the reasoning for absences and invisibility in relation to asexuality. In 
bringing together socio-political context alongside instances of asexual invisibility and 
erasure I enable a politically charged critique of the dominant discourses that have 
marginalized or ignored asexuality. In my research I therefore consider historical case 
studies in relation to the context through which they were produced and their wider 
relation to other works within the medicalization, pathologization and politicization 
assemblages, to enable the mapping and re-presentation of erased (a)sexual histories. I 
draw on Cvetkovich (2003) to enable the mapping and re-presentation of erased 
(a)sexual histories. My research understands the invisibility and erasure of asexuality as 
“haunt[ing] the present” (Cvetkovich 2003: 6). Through Foucauldian (2003) genealogy 
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I intend to re-present the history of asexuality, drawing on instances of erasure and 
invisibility that “haunt the present” (Cvetkovich 2003: 6).  
 
Gordon (2011, 2008) also considers haunting as a unity of strategic power-systems and 
meaning. Power systems that facilitate the erasure of asexuality “make themselves 
known and their impacts felt in everyday life” (Gordon 2011: 2). For example, the 
criminalisation of suicide persists to haunt contemporary discourses and language, 
suicide is still referred to in Western society as an act that is ‘committed’ akin to the 
way we refer to crimes, and suicide ‘prevention’ charities such as PAPYRUS (2015) put 
the onus of suicide prevention on the individual, rather than society. In a similar way, 
the shaping of the object through haunting is explored through my case study of the 
Asexuality Visibility and Education Network. I employ the notion of haunting to 
highlight the importance of re-presenting asexual histories in order to enable a broader 
reading of what asexuality might be. I seek to use the work of Gordon (2011, 2008) and 
Cvetkovich (2003) to explore their conceptualisations of haunting. I posit that haunting 
can be considered a form of affective invisibility; an invisibility that has shaped 
contemporary asexuality, and enabled asexuality to function as an absently present node 
within the assemblages of medicalization, pathologization and politicization. Haunting 
can be understood as an affective invisibility that occurs in the unseen or undocumented 
moments and instances in (a)sexual histories, that shapes lives or futures. I argue that 
the analysis of affective invisibility enables an alternative history to (a)sexuality that 
can destabilise the normative, and understand asexuality as a grounds for re-thinking 
“the centrality of sex” (Przybylo and Cooper 2014: 298) rather than understanding it in 
relation to an ‘absence’ or ‘lack’ (Foucault 2003, Hook 2007).  
 
The affectivity of invisibility in shaping futures is illuminated through careful 
genealogical deconstruction of the unseen or erased. In deconstructing the unseen or 
erased moments of asexual history I am able to provide an account of the multiplicity 
present in contemporary asexual identity. The pre-verbal quality of affective invisibility 
is used as a means to open up binaries “in order to ‘hear’ that which has been previously 
discounted, disregarded, or unobserved” (Mazzei 2007: 71) due to its inaccessibility 
through language. Moments that have remained invisible or that have been silenced 
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through language are carefully deconstructed using the Derridian (1976) notion of the 
trace. Paying attention to the invisible and focussing on the power-systems that have 
constructed typical histories enables a deeper understanding of asexuality, its 
invisibility, and how that might be experienced in contemporary society through 
haunting (Foucault 1980, Gordon 2008, Mazzei 2007).  
1.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion to this chapter, my thesis thematically analyses case studies of traces of 
‘absence’ and ‘silence’ surrounding (a)sexuality, deconstructing the discourses that 
have contributed to the privileging of heterosexual desire throughout history. In doing 
so I seek to illuminate the ways in which (a)sexual practices outside of 
heteropenetrative and reproductive sexuality have come to defined through lack. 
Through deconstruction of discourses that have contributed to the maintenance of 
(a)sexual invisibility throughout history, I build a methodological framework for 
researching identities claimed to be culturally or socially invisible. I map traces of 
(a)sexuality throughout the history of hetero-sex, demonstrating the ways in which non-
desire becomes understood as something that must be ‘fixed’, erased, or understood as 
being outside of Western conceptualisations of sexuality. I employ Derrida’s (1976) 
notion of the ‘trace’ alongside conceptualisations of haunting (Cvetkovich 2003, 
Gordon 2008) to highlight the importance of re-presenting asexual histories in order to 
enable a broader reading of what asexuality might be and do. I seek to explore haunting 
as an affective invisibility, that enables an alternative history to (a)sexuality to 
destabilise the normative, and understand asexuality as a grounds for re-thinking “the 
centrality of sex” rather than understanding it in relation to an ‘absence’ or ‘lack’ 
(Foucault 2003, Przybylo and Cooper 2014: 298). Historic discourses can be understood 
as haunting contemporary Western understandings of asexuality, thus Derrida’s (1976) 
notion of the ‘trace’ is methodologically central to my project, in terms of opening up 
space “in order to ‘hear’ that which has previously been discounted, disregarded, or 
unobserved” due to its absence or inaccessibility (Mazzei 2007: 71).   
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2. Vibrators and Viagra: From Biology to Chemistry 
The 2012 episode of Fox Network TV series House ‘Better Half’ (2012), features a 
couple that self-identify as asexual. The main characters Wilson and House discuss the 
patients, with Wilson informing House “close to 1% of the population identifies as 
asexual”. House is quick to dismiss Wilson’s claim of asexuality as legitimate betting 
$100 that he can find a “medical reason” why the patient doesn’t want to have sex. 
House goes on to argue that sex “is the fundamental drive of our species” and “lots of 
people don't have sex” but “the only people who don't want sex are either sick, dead or 
lying” (House: Better Half 2012). House (House: Better Half 2012) simultaneously 
frames asexuality as something ‘abnormal’, devoid of agency and deceptive; House’s 
argument positions asexuality as something undesirable, unwanted and in need of 
prevention. Positioning people who “don’t want sex” as “sick”, renders asexuality as 
something in need of a ‘cure’, whilst “dead” implies they are devoid of agency and do 
not have the capacity to make conscious decisions for themselves (House: Better Half 
2012). The implication that if you “don’t want sex” you must be “lying” is also 
problematic, as not only does it position asexuality as pathological but also as being 
fictitious, a myth, or deceitful (House: Better Half 2012). The episode resolved with the 
patient being ‘cured’ of their asexuality, after House determines “high levels of 
prolactin” are responsible for the ‘patients’ ‘lack’ of sexual desire (House: Better Half 
2012). House: ‘Better Half’ (2012) contains traces throughout of historic medical 
practices that have framed (a)sexuality, (a)sexual practices, or anything outside of 
hetero-penetrative conceptualisations of sex as a physical ‘sickness’ in need of medical 
cure through the assertion that anything outside of hetero(penetrative) or procreative sex 
is ‘unnatural’ and a biological sickness. In the following chapter I explore the 
underlying presence of (a)sexuality in which historic medical discourses that have 
constructed (a)sexuality in way which haunts representations of asexuality in 
contemporary Western popular culture and allows House: ‘Better Half’ (2012) to make 
sense. 
 
The following chapter provides an exploration of the medicalization assemblage and the 
ways in which it has contributed to the maintenance of the invisibility and erasure of 
asexuality. I deconstruct historic medical works paying close attention the socio-
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political contexts through which they were produced and to the absent presence of the 
trace of (a)sexuality within each. I first explore the medicalization of hysteria and 
frigidity through the use of vibrators and hydrotherapy to examine the ways in which a 
‘lack’ of female orgasm became located as a ‘disease’ that necessitated treatment. 
Following an exploration of hysteria I turn to Viagra as one of multiple contemporary 
‘cures’ to ‘sexual dysfunction’. Throughout I consider the ways in which the affective 
invisibility of asexuality in these case studies has shaped the landscape of more 
contemporary medically orientated conceptualisations of asexuality, such as those from 
Bogaert (2012), that regard asexuality as an innate ‘lack’ of sexual desire or attraction.  
 
The medicalization of sexuality occurred as a response to the rise of enlightenment 
thinking in the late 18th century. Enlightenment thinking promoted the increase of 
scientific discourse through knowledge being equated with science and reason (Venn 
2006). Lyotard (1988: 31) describes the Enlightenment as propagating ideas that “the 
enhancement of the whole of humanity” is achievable “through the development of 
capitalist technoscience”. New information was ‘discovered’ in relation to sexuality 
during the 18th century, which was taken to bolster traditional Christian notions that 
marriage was a necessary condition for (hetero)sexual expression (Potts 2002). 
Enlightenment thinking placed emphasis on individuals and their autonomy “rather than 
that of religious doctrine” (Venn 2006: 478). Despite the re-organization of society 
around ‘reason’ and science, religion has persisted to be a prevalent factor in society up 
until the present day. Instead of replacing religion completely the Enlightenment’s 
ultimate aim was ‘progress’. The Enlightenment’s definition of ‘progress’ as creating a 
more efficient society relied on the notion that there was a ‘superior’ and ‘natural’ state 
to aspire to in all aspects of life, including sexuality. Through organizing both social 
and political climates around ‘scientific progress’, the shift towards enlightenment 
thinking created space for new modes of governmentality and new forms of regulation. 
 
One form of institutional regulation to emergence in response to enlightenment thinking 
was medicalization. The medicalization of sexuality occurred over time in response to 
18th century enlightenment thinking and became a significant intellectual trend for 
Western society during the 20th century. Medicalization entailed the re-definition of life 
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experiences into objects of medical analysis and regulation (Tiefer 1994). Medicine 
therefore came to “exercise authority over areas of life not previously considered 
medical” (Tiefer 1994: 365). Tiefer (1994) identifies two major movements within 
medicalization, the first of which reframes previously criminal, sinful or anti-social 
‘acts’ as the domain of medicine, whilst the second redefined common (largely 
physical) life events as medical ‘problems’. Rose remarks that discourses, such as 
medicalization, structure both experiences and languages and require “us to speak of 
ourselves in particular vocabularies, to evaluate ourselves in relation to certain norms” 
(1997: 234). For Foucault (2004) ‘norms’ form the foundations of power structures that 
transform subjects; “the norm brings with it a principle of both qualification and 
correction” (2004: 50).  
 
Reissman (1983: 3) concludes medical professionals sought “to medicalize experience 
because of their specific beliefs and economic interests”. The medicalization of 
individuals occurs through what Foucault (1989) calls ‘the medical gaze’. As a 
disciplinary technology ‘the medical gaze’ implements a dichotomous split between 
identity and body; experience and identity are discounted as untrustworthy and 
insignificant in favour of biology (Foucault 1989). The ‘medical gaze’ focused the 
attention of doctors on what could be physically observed in a patient, privileging 
physiology above the psyche and positioning ‘patients’ as “passive object[s] subject to 
medical intervention” (Bell 2009: 152). Through creating a binary separation and 
hierarchy of body/identity, medical practitioners are able to focus their attention on the 
physiology of sex and ‘symptoms’ which are removed from individual circumstance to 
create ‘one-size-fits-all’ models of ‘treatment’; “the ‘artificial’ diseases of the hospital 
permit pathological events to be reduced to the homogeneous” (Foucault 1989: 135). 
Anything considered outside of the ‘norm’ was categorized and put under the medical 
gaze in order to be ‘treated’ and bring subjects back into line with societal standards 
(Foucault 2004, Foucault 1989). It is the medical gaze that has served to enable the 
institutionalization of heteronormativity and self-regulation (Foucault 1980). 
 
The medicalization of sexuality relies on the assumptions that there is a normative 
standard of sexuality to aspire to (hetero-penetrative), and that everybody knows what 
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normative sexuality is, and is capable of or desires to perform sexuality in such a way 
(Tiefer 1994) (for a discussion of ‘normative’ sexuality see pages 7-8 in the previous 
chapter). The conceptualisation of ‘normative’ standards is tied heavily to the Western 
adaptation of statistics in the 18th century and its adoption by the eugenics movement 
(Davis 2006). Through numerical data, eugenicists are able to construct a statistical 
ideal of the ‘norm’, and thus the opposite: the deviant body (Davis 2006, Meleo-Erwin 
2012). Medical and psychiatric models of ‘treatment’ use measurement and calculation 
to enforce a binary separation of the ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ or ‘pathological’ (Foucault 
1989, Laquer 1990). For Laqueur (1990: 188) medical control is implemented through 
the “strip[ping] away [of] individual differences, affective and material, so as to 
perceive the essence of health or disease in organ tissues”. Laquer’s (1990) definition of 
medical control strongly implies that the body can be fixed, where as morals cannot. By 
separating ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ bodies, and situating sexuality as a problem of 
the ‘body’ rather than of morals, medical institutions were able to build an economy on 
the principle that they could ‘fix’ the body. By claiming that medical practices and 
institutions were able to ‘cure’, ‘fix’ and improve the body, models of medicalization 
fitted in with the Enlightenment’s quest for progress. In turn medical establishments 
were able to construct discourses of abnormal sexuality, which could be ‘cured’ by 
medical professionals rather than through moral guidance or religion (Downing, 
Morland and Sullivan 2015, Tiefer 1994). Reissman (1983: 3) concludes that medical 
professionals sought “to medicalize experience because of their specific beliefs and 
economic interests”. 
 
The decline of religion made way for a rise in discourses of technological solutions and 
individualism, enabling a growth in the medicalization of social experiences (Conrad 
1992). Medicalization entailed the re-definition of life experiences such as pregnancy, 
balding, grief and menstruation into objects of medical analysis and regulation (Tiefer 
1994). Medicine came to “exercise authority over areas of life not previously considered 
medical” (Tiefer 1994: 365). Medicine claimed to offer the origins and ‘cures’ for 
‘abnormal’ social or physical ‘problems’ (Potts 2002). Tiefer (1994) identifies two 
major movements within medicalization, the first of which reframes previously 
criminal, sinful or anti-social ‘acts’ as the domain of medicine, whilst the second 
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redefined common (largely physical) life events as medical ‘problems’. Both ‘moral’ 
and the ‘physical’ life events in regards to sexuality were redefined as medical 
‘problems’ (Tiefer 1994). I draw upon the history of vibrators in ‘treatment’ of hysteria 
to further explore the redefinition of social and ‘physical’ experiences into medical 
‘problems’.  
 
In the following section I deconstruct the assemblage of medicalization focusing 
specifically on ‘hysteria’, ‘frigidity’ and the medical ‘cures’ that were used to ‘treat’ 
women as a result. I pay attention to the traces of (a)sexuality within the history of 
hetero-sex and the ways in which ‘absence’ or ‘lack’ become understood as deviant and 
abnormal. I trace the discourses and socio-cultural contexts that led to the 
medicalization of female ‘hysteria’ and ‘frigidity’ listening to moments of silence 
around ‘normative’ sexuality in order to locate (a)sexuality as meaningfully present and 
simultaneously erased.  
 
2.1 Hysteria, Frigidity & Vibrators 
Despite the dismissal of the terms ‘hysteria’ and ‘frigidity’ in contemporary medical 
practice, their conceptualisations persist to haunt contemporary discourses of sexuality; 
“many psychiatrists and sexologists of our time continue to elaborate a complex 
network of ways in which women can be considered abnormally lacking in desire, 
pleasure or orgasm” (Cryle and Moore 2011: 8). Hysteria was conceptualised 
historically as a varied and vast range of ‘symptoms’ that collected any otherwise un-
treatable social, physical or psychological ‘ill’ into one ‘medical’ category. In ancient 
Greece up and in European medicine prior to the late 19th century hysteria was 
considered an innate female pathology caused by a random ‘wandering’ of the womb 
around the body (Richardson 2003). As Bell has highlighted, medical epistemology has 
drawn on the Enlightenment’s masculinist conceptualisations of ‘norms’, implicitly 
positioning ‘woman’ as always “the unhealthy, abject fail to its model man…woman’s 
unruly body…then warrant[s] her containment via masculinized medicine” (2009: 153). 
Causes of hysteria in the late 19th and early 20th centuries ranged from drinking too 
much tea, to irregular periods and impotent husbands (Hock 2011). Similarly, frigidity 
was presented in ‘medical’ and fictional literature alike as “an utter lack of desire” or 
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“an inability to satisfy desires that were actually present” (Cryle 2008: 118). During the 
19th century frigidity came to be considered as a wide spread female phenomenon and 
‘ill’, present in “all women who criticise[d] or resist[ed] domination by men”, both 
hysteria and frigidity denied agency to women and served to regulate masculine defined 
‘norms’ of sexuality which positioned male orgasm, achieved through penile-vagina 
penetration as the ultimate aim of sex (Cryle 2008: 128) (see pages 7-8 in the previous 
chapter for further discussion of ‘normative’ sexuality in Western society). I therefore 
turn to Maines (1999) documenting of the cultural history of vibrators to trace the 
medicalization of (a)sexuality. I employ the works of Derrida (1976, 1993, 1997), 
Mazzei (2007) and Gordon (2008, 2011) in order to deconstruct the ways in which 
medicalization, the dominant discourses it constructs, and the absences present within 
them have shaped contemporary understandings of (a)sexuality.  
 
This subsection predominantly deals with the technologies used to ‘treat’ frigidity and 
hysteria. However, before turning to address these I discuss one ‘technique’ afforded 
relatively little attention in medical documentation; rape. Whilst rape is scarcely named 
in historic literature its trace remains. Eichenlaub’s (1967: NP) work remarked “a 
woman should never turn down her husband on appropriate occasions simply because 
she has no yearning of her own for sex or because she is tired or sleepy, or indeed for 
any reason short of a genuine disability”. As Gavey (2005) has highlighted women’s 
sexual desires, pleasures, wants or needs were neglected by social contexts that 
privileged men. In contemporary terms it is clear that Eichenlaub’s ‘marriage guidance’ 
condones, in no uncertain terms, non-consensual sex, because it is a woman’s ‘duty’ to 
provide her husband with sex, and she “should never turn down her husband” (1967: 
NP). In this sense, rape was understood as impossible within marriage. “The task of 
defining the truth of sex, [and] rape… was left in the hand of [largely male] scientific 
and medical experts” (Gavey 2005: 19), leading to rape being understood as “a violent 
and dangerous man grabbing a woman in a dark street, or breaking into her home at 
night” (Gavey 2005: 1). The definition of rape as only occurring between strangers 
meant that ‘real’ rape was considered a rare occurrence, despite the idea that having sex 
with her husband was an obligation for women.  
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With sex considered obligatory for wedded women, medical ‘concern’ about sexual 
dysfunction steadily increased throughout the 19th Century. Medical works promoted 
the idea that women who did not get married and fulfil their obligations to their 
husbands could become ‘insane’, helping to enforce the expectation that women should 
have sex. Harvey (1847: 189-190) describes young women who “continue too long 
unwedded” as being “seized upon with serious symptoms” remarking “women 
occasionally become insane through ungratified desire”. However, Lunbeck notes that 
hypersexuality was also ‘identified’ “as an issue of pressing medical concern” (1987: 
513) by prominent Western psychiatrists during the early 20th century.  Hypersexuality 
was a diagnosis only available to women, sexual curiosity was deemed normative for 
men, where as for women any sex outside of marriage was deemed as “abnormally 
aggressive” (Lunbeck 1987: 513). Hypersexuality was considered “an inborn condition 
for which there was no remedy save institutionalization” (Lunbeck 1987: 513). Case 
files from the Boston Psychopathic Hospital revealed hypersexuality was diagnosed in 
primarily younger women, nearly always of working class backgrounds (Lunbeck 
1987). The medicalization of both hyper-sexuality and hypo-sexuality made ‘normative’ 
standards of sexuality increasingly impossible to achieve or conform to. 
 
Maines (1999) tracks the development and evolution of the medicalization of womens 
sexuality, noting a series of complex and interconnected discourses that enabled the 
production of vibrators as a legitimate ‘cure’ for a ‘lack’ of female orgasm. Religious 
discourses that had framed hetero-penetrative sexuality as the only ‘natural’ and 
acceptable form of sexuality persisted to haunt 19th century Western medicine 
(Downing, Morland and Sullivan 2015, Foucault 1978). Rose (1997) argues that the 
argument that medicine and ‘psy’ have taken the place of religion is too simplistic. As 
Derrida (1997: 6) remarks, the establishing moment of an institution, whilst producing 
new discourses, “also continues something, is true to the memory of the past, to a 
heritage”; the institution of medicine can be understood as being true to the “memory” 
of religion in its preservation of heteronormativity. Bullough (1994: 23) documents the 
medical profession as regarding ‘unnatural sex’ as “worse than almost any other disease 
for it…gradually took away life itself”. While religion enforced heteronormativity or 
abstinence through doctrine that identified sexuality outside of hetero-penetrative and 
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reproductive sex as sinful, medicine maintained heteronormativity in the same way 
through reasoning that the ‘progress’ of the species was dependent on reproduction and 
that to not practice sexuality that supported reproduction was unnatural and abnormal 
(Potts 2002).  
 
Medicalization is haunted by assumptions of religion that assume both that there is a 
normative standard of sexuality, and that normative sexuality is something that 
everybody aspires to (Tiefer 1994). Normative Western standards of sex are understood 
to be between a man and a woman, involve penile penetration of the vagina, and result 
in (male) orgasm (for further discussion of normative Western standards of sex see 
pages 7-8 in the previous chapter). We are held to normative standards of sexuality by 
the endless number of sexual ‘dysfunctions’ listed in medical works; these currently 
include: Premature Ejaculation, Delayed Ejaculation, Female Sexual Interest/Arousal 
Disorder, Female Orgasmic Disorder, Penetration Disorder, and Male Hypoactive 
Sexual Desire Disorder, to name just a few (American Psychiatric Association 2013, 
Barker 2013). In addition, cultural artefacts that propagate heteronormativity such as 
advertisements, cinema and literature continue to enforce the idea that ‘normative’ 
standards of sexuality are more desirable and should be aspired to (Barker 2013). 
However, such standards become impossible to inhabit; Barker (2013: 61) 
acknowledges that normative standards of sexuality “actually causes people to have 
sexual problems which they wouldn’t have if the kind of sex that they found most 
pleasurable was considered just as normal as penis-in-vagina intercourse”. Medical 
works render sexual activities outside of hetero-penetrative monogamy as ‘unnatural’, 
‘dysfunctional’, ‘unhealthy’ and ‘abnormal’. Foucault (1978: 3) documents 
heterosexuality as an enforced norm that “safeguarded the truth, and reserved the right 
to speak while retaining the principle of secrecy”. Barker (2013: 63) writes that the 
Western quest “to find evidence that sexualities can be explained by biology in order to 
provide their legitimacy” relies on the assumption that somehow biologically innate 
characteristics are more ‘natural’ and are therefore “more acceptable or good”.  
 
As a result of lingering religious discourses that have framed pro-creation as the 
ultimate aim of existence, a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of visible orgasm became framed as a 
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‘sickness’ in need of a cure. Because medicine draws on masculine constructs of the 
‘healthy’ body, historically mutual orgasm was understood as central to pro-creation 
(Lloyd 2005); a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of orgasm in women came to be understood to be 
undesirable and a symptom of infertility and sexual dysfunction. Frith (2014: 1) points 
out that “despite detailed scientific scrutiny and close attention to bodily signs, the 
authenticity of women’s orgasm remains a site of cultural anxiety”. Though framed as 
necessary and ‘natural’ female orgasm is also constructed “as inherently invisible or un-
see-able” (Frith 2014: 1). Despite being ‘invisible’ or ‘un-see-able’ (Frith 2014), female 
orgasm was considered to be the only ‘cure’ for hysteria in the early 20th century 
(Maines 1999). For Foucault (1978) hysteria is “an effect of power’s saturation of 
women’s body” (Grosz 1994: 157). Dominant narratives of 19th century frame the West 
as sexually repressed and conservative. Since the development of the bourgeoisie, 
activities that were simply for gratification were frowned on, sex became a private affair 
that was only considered legitimate if it took place within the confines of heterosexual 
marriage (Foucault 1978). Foucault (1978) analyses the ways that sex outside of 
heterosexual marriage was rendered unthinkable and unspeakable, aside from in a 
specific ‘outlet’ for confession; psychiatry. However, despite the dominance of the 
repressive hypothesis in public discourse, Foucault (1978) argues that 19th century 
Western society was in fact entirely organized around sex. Hystericization resulted in 
women’s bodies being “equated with sexuality, appropriated by pathology and 
identified with the social body” (Beizer 1994: 232), largely to serve the desires of men.  
 
Through the “hystericization of women’s bodies” heteronormative sexuality was 
reinforced as the most ‘natural’ and only legitimate sexuality (Foucault 1978: 104). 
Despite hetero-penetrative sex failing to produce orgasm in most women, masturbation 
or any sexual activity outside of heterosexual monogamy continued to be framed as 
‘morally wrong’. Jagose (2010: 525) notes that “women’s erotic capacities and 
requirements” are “so little valued or understood that women routinely simulated 
orgasm in heterosexual intercourse”, the masculinization of sexual desire and 
privileging of men more widely ensured women’s (hetero)sexual pleasure was afforded 
little concern. Boyle (1993) has argued that anxieties over female sexual (dys)function 
arose as a consequence of the threat that women’s sexual dissatisfaction posed to 
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heterosexual marriage and the nuclear family. Such anxieties enabled the construction 
of non-penetrative sex as ‘morally wrong’, and “relegated the task of relieving the 
symptoms of female arousal to medical treatment”; producing clitoral orgasm was 
framed solely as a medical procedure, non-sexual, and therefore morally unproblematic 
(Maines 1999: 3). The masculinisation of sexual desire alongside “asymmetrically 
gendered access to sexual pleasure” (Jargose 2010: 528) enabled the assertion that 
female orgasm was a “crisis of disease” (Maines 1999: 7) and meant heteronormativity 
and sex-centrism went unchallenged. The privileging of male sexual desire over that of 
women, constructed women’s sexual dissatisfaction as symptomatic of an innate female 
‘problem’ or ‘disease’, rather than a problem with heteropenetrative models of sex. The 
idea that heteropenetrative sex might not be the most pleasurable form of sexual 
stimulation for women was inconceivable as a result of discourses that promoted 
heteropenetrative sex as both a ‘necessity’ and the ‘norm’ (Jargose 2010).  
 
Positioning any expression of sexuality outside of hetero-penetrative sexuality as not 
the “real thing” meant medical massage or stimulation of the clitoris or vulva was not 
considered sexual (Maines 1999: 10). Hydrotherapeutic ‘cures’ for hysteria arose during 
the late 18th century and were housed in private clinics or spas, where the ‘patient’ 
would be exposed to pressurised streams of water in an attempt to stimulate orgasm 
(Maines 1999). Scoutetten (1843: 239-241) detailed hydrotherapeutic ‘cures’ for 
hysteria, commenting “the first impression produced by the jet of water is painful, but 
soon the effect of the pressure…create[s] for many persons so agreeable a sensation that 
it is necessary to take precautions that they do not go beyond the prescribed time”. 
Taylor (1885) also argued treatment for female hysteria should be supervised by 
physicians at all times to prevent ‘overindulgence’, or encourage the onset of 
‘hypersexuality’ (Lunbeck 1987).  
 
Maines (1999) concludes that hydrotherapy would have been prohibitively expensive 
for all except the upper-middle classes due to travel expenses, as well as treatment 
costs. Comparisons can be drawn between the medicalization of female hysteria and the 
criminalization of drug addiction in contemporary society; Maines (1999) work 
suggests that the wealthy would have accessed hydrotherapy to ‘cure’ their hysteria, 
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whilst the poor would have ended up in asylums, in a similar way to wealthy drug 
addicts going to rehabilitation centres, whilst poorer demographics are often caught up 
in Western judicial systems and go to prison. The expense of hydrotherapeutic ‘cures’, 
both for patients and in terms of installation costs, limited their use and led 
technologists to pursue more portable and accessible ‘solutions’ (Maines 1999).  
 
Trower (2012) reports vibration had been frequently mentioned in medical journals 
since the 1860’s, where vibration from railways, sewing machines and bicycles were 
recurrently listed as a cause of concern in regards to sexual transgression. Ellis (1927: 
217) went as far as to argue the sewing machine was capable of “exciting auto-erotic 
manifestations” and could lead to masturbation, “nocturnal emissions” and directly 
cause involuntary orgasm. However, it took relatively little time for medicine to 
capitalize on developments in new technology. Rockwell (1867) claims the first electro-
mechanical vibrators were introduced to medicine in 1878 in response to complaints 
from physicians that manual massage was too time consuming in contrast to new 
technologies. Technologies are understood as something that enables human beings to 
“extend beyond” their own “limitations, physical, existential, psychological, or 
otherwise” (Boulter 2005: 54). William (1906: 56) argued manual massage “consumes a 
painstaking hour to accomplish much less profound results than are easily effected by 
the other [the vibrator] in a short five or ten minutes”. Electro-mechanical vibrators 
“mechanized speed and efficiency” and “improved clinical productivity” (Maines 1999: 
11), in this sense extending the ‘limitations’ of clinicians (Boulter 2005). Reduced in-
house costs, increased accessibility, and the employment of vibrators to treat a ‘disease’ 
that could never be ‘cured’ quickly became profitable for medicine (Maines 1999).  
 
For Foucault (1978) hydrotherapeutic ‘cures’, vibrators and other massage technologies 
designed to ‘treat’ hysteria arose as a product of scientific and medical discourses that 
served to regulate and control society. Medicine “created an entire organic, functional 
or mental pathology arising out of ‘incomplete’ sexual practices; ….it undertook to 
manage them” (Foucault 1978: 41). The treatment of ‘hysteria’ through medical 
massage, hydrotherapy and vibrators served to regulate and manage (a)sexuality by 
writing it out of history (Foucault 1978). The possibility of desire (or ‘lack’ of) outside 
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of heterosexuality is erased through the medicalization of ‘hysteria’; the use of medical 
stimulation of the clitoris is not regarded as sexual because it exists outside of hetero-
centric discourses which frame ‘proper’ sexuality as hetero-penetrative and reproductive 
(Downing, Morland and Sullivan 2015).  
 
Through heteronormativity and medical discourses that frame hetero-penetrative 
sexuality as ‘proper’ sexuality, asexuality has come to be defined historically only 
through a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of sexual desires and practices. Asexuality therefore 
becomes something that must be confessed in order to be acknowledged as present, but 
if we consider asexuality’s absence as a “meaning full” (emphasis in original) presence 
in itself we open up possibilities to challenge Western hierarchies of relationships which 
privilege the sexual (Mazzei 2007: 29, Przybylo 2011). The absence of asexuality in 
traditional histories “bears ambiguous and therefore resistant potential” (Johnson 2011: 
59).  Rather than an ‘absence’ or ‘lack’, the notable silence of asexuality in traditional 
histories instead opens up space to transgress heteronormative understandings of 
attraction, desire, and sexuality itself. Using Derrida’s (1997: 6) understanding of 
“…the tension between memory…the preservation of something that has been given to 
us and, at the same time, heterogeneity, something absolutely new… a break” the 
silence of asexual histories can be considered as resistive and “purpose full” (emphasis 
in original) in its potential to disrupt gendered, heteronormative, sex-centric, Western 




Due to medicine privileging the body and physical aspects of sex over desire, attraction 
and emotion, sexual ‘dysfunctions’ were located in the anatomy. Medicalization 
locating sexual ‘dysfunction’ in the anatomy resulted in the development of a range of 
physical interventions, discussed in the previous subsection, in attempt to ‘cure’ or ‘fix’ 
these dysfunctions (Potts et al. 2004). In order to explore how the medicalization of 
sexuality persists to haunt contemporary Western society I turn now to discuss Viagra. 
Brooks (2001) comments on the continued attention afforded to develop methods to 
‘improve’ male sexual performance, arguing, “medical science has relentlessly perused 
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an engineering solution to male sexual difficulties” (Brooks 2001: 54). In the following 
subsection I turn to examine how ‘medical treatments’ for sexual ‘dysfunction’ have 
shifted from techniques of “mechanical engineering” outlined in the previous 
subsection, to “chemical engineering” (Brooks 2001: 55) made readily available in 
contemporary society through the pharmaceutical industry.  
	  
Viagra has been largely documented as “the fastest selling drug in history” (McGinn 
1988: 44). First approved in 1998, Viagra has been pervasively been framed as a ‘cure’ 
or ‘fix’ to erectile dysfunction, ‘sexual impotence’ and an absence of (hetero)sexual 
intercourse in relationships (Tiefer 2006). Marketing has framed Viagra as a drug that 
holds the ‘solution’ to personal and cultural ‘crises’ in masculinity, and has marked 
non-sexual relationships as unhappy, and failed (Vares and Braun 2006). Prior to 
Viagra, the onus to conform to ‘normative’ standards of heterosex had largely been 
placed on frigid women; men who were unable to sustain or achieve an erection had 
been positioned as simply ‘unable to perform’ (Loe 2004). However, the rise of feminist 
and sexual liberation movements (see further discussion in Chapter 4), alongside the 
increased availability of contraception resulted in a mounting male responsibility to 
successfully satisfy women (Loe 2004). In Western society ‘healthy’ or ‘successful’ 
masculine sexuality has been constructed around the idea that a “male body must be 
capable of producing ‘normal’ erections” (Potts et al. 2004: 490). ‘Normal’ erections 
are understood to be achievable ‘on demand’, and capable of satisfying “both the man 
and his (female) sexual partner” (Potts et al. 2004: 490), regardless of context. Medical 
research surrounding ‘sexual dysfunction’ was prominent both during the build up to 
and following the release of Viagra (Brooks 2001); Laumann’s paper explored the 
prevalence of ‘sexual dysfunction’ in the United Stated of America, and through 
interviews with participants surrounding their sexual experiences estimated that around 
a third of all men suffered from a form of ‘sexual dysfunction’, and concluded that this 
was an issue of “public health concern” (1999: NP). Laumann’s (1999) research, as well 
as multiple others (see the National Health and Social Life Survey 1992) received 
considerable media attention, and served to further fuel a ‘crisis’ of masculinity for men 
that perceived themselves as sexually dysfunctional as a result (Brooks 2001). Through 
this ‘crisis’ of masculinity, Viagra was able to present itself as a “tool capable of 
‘fixing’ the broken male machine” (Loe 2004, Potts et al. 2004: 490). Tiefer (2006) 
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argues Viagra has transcended medical boundaries, and has become a cultural icon that 
continues to shape social norms and practices. An ‘absence’ or ‘lack’ of heterosexual 
performance has been constructed as emasculating through societally perpetuated 
narratives of masculinity that revolve around engagement in (hetero)penetrative sex 
(Potts et al. 2004). Viagra has transcended medical boundaries to be constructed as a 
‘cure’ not only for a ‘medical problem’ but for personal, social and cultural ‘problems’ 
too (Tiefer 2006).  
 
U.S. marketing campaigns for Viagra in the early 2000s portray distant and miserable 
looking couples contrasted with post-Viagra happy heterosexually active couples. 
Viagra’s marketing campaigns emphasize that everybody should want to engage in 
(hetero)penetrative sex, and that to not do so is to be isolated and unfulfilled (Vares and 
Braun 2006, Tiefer 2006). In using such campaigns Viagra advertisements compound 
the Western notion that normative sexuality is (hetero)penetrative. Ahmed (2010) 
argues that it is difficult to separate perceptions of happiness and ‘the good life’ from 
the heteronormative narratives that have been privileged historically. In Western society 
those who do not conform to (hetero)penetrative expectations have become marked as 
less valuable members of society through capitalist presumptions that to be happy is to 
be economically productive, and that to be happy necessarily involves being 
(hetero)sexually active (Ahmed 2010). Viagra’s marketing campaigns position 
asexuality or an absence of (hetero)sexual desire or engagement as synonymous with 
being unhappy and has further marginalized asexuality.  
 
The (in)visibility of asexuality and an ‘absence’ of (hetero)sexual desire becomes 
further compounded when considering Bailey’s (1988) discussion of sex as a consumer 
object. Western society understands consumption as integral to constructing an 
individual identity; the “consumer is their own entrepreneur, [their] own producer of 
satisfaction and pleasure” (Chen 2013: 444). Foucault (2008) considers consumption as 
an entrepreneurial activity that transforms individuals into economic subjects; 
individual enterprise entities that uphold capitalist Western societies (Chen 2013). In 
capitalist Western societies to not consume sex is to be considered a bad economic 
subject; as not contributing to society through consumption (Bailey 1988, Lazzarato 
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2009). In Western society the worth of a subject is often measured in regards to their 
economic value (Lazzarato 2009). In this sense, the asexual is considered a bad 
economic subject as a result of framing sex as a consumer object (Bailey 1988), and 
through attributing individual worth on the grounds of economic value (Lazzarato 
2009). Western society understands asexuality as a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of sexual desire, 
which also assumes a ‘lack’ of consumption, not just of sex, but also of pornography, 
sex aids or toys, and contraceptives. The notion of the bad economic subject can also be 
applied to the case study of Viagra; if a subject who experiences a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of 
(hetero)sexual desire then refuses to consume Viagra to ‘fix’ their lack of sexual 
consumption, their status as a bad economic subject is underlined by their double 
‘refusal’ to consume. Capitalist models of consumption therefore position asexuality 
even further outside of normative sexuality in sex-centric Western society.  
 
Genealogically I am interested in teasing apart the “apparent progressions of events, to 
fragment the cohesion” of dominant discourses surrounding Viagra, in order to trace 
how the medicalization of (a)sexuality became actualised, and the ways in which 
medicalization has further compounded asexual erasure (Hook 2005: 11). In the lead up 
to the production and marketing of Viagra’s societal discourses had become 
increasingly medically essentialist (see further exploration in 2.1 pages 27-34), locating 
everything in the body (Loe 2004). Through medical essentialism social experiences 
become constructed as being either ‘healthy’ or ‘sick’; common life events became 
understood as ‘medical problems’ (Tiefer 1994). Through the production and expansion 
of medical categories for sexual dysfunction Viagra was constructed as a consumer 
‘solution’ to these ‘problems’. Whilst Viagra is not chronologically the first example of 
the medicalization of (a)sexual practices (see discussion above in 2.1 pages 27-34), its 
popularity and significance was propagated through the circumstances and discourses 
surrounding its production. The neoliberal context in which Viagra was deployed 
produced subjects as ‘individuals’ and consumers whose societal value and worth was 
determined “by their capacity for ‘self-care’ – their ability to provide for their own 
needs” (Brown 2006: 694). Whilst surgical intervention necessarily involved the 
reliance of professionals to identify, ‘provide’ and ‘care’ for the subject’s needs, Viagra 
could be self-administered, marking it apart from previously available examples of 
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(a)sexual medicalization such as vacuum pumps, erectile implants and surgical 
intervention (Baglia 2005). As a self-administered ‘cure’ Viagra was not only more 
accessible, but quicker; less time consuming for medical experts and patients alike, and 
for the ‘patient’ the desired result of “erections upon demand – a magic cure to sexual 
dysfunction” (Brooks 2001: 55) was more quickly attained (Baglia 2005).  
 
At the same time as expanding medical categories and the rise of medically essentialist 
views, LGBT and sex positive feminist movements were raising the visibility of 
sexuality, suggesting different models of sexuality and promoting alternative sexual 
practices (Attwood 2009, Weeks 1989). The mainstreaming of sexuality, whilst further 
erasing asexual practices, rendered sexuality subject to increased control and regulation 
(Foucault 1978, Foucault 1995, Weeks 1989). Medical ‘advancement’ was equated to 
progress, where Viagra serves as a mode of regulation, designed to mould the subject 
into a more productive and valuable member of society (Foucault 1995, Loe 2004). 
Through the National Health and Social Life Survey of 1992 (Laumann et al. 1992) one 
yes/no question recorded over 40% of the population as sexually dysfunctional (through 
low or absent sexual arousal, desire or attraction); constructing sexual dysfunction or a 
‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of (hetero)sexual desire as a ‘common problem’ (Conrad and 
Schneider 2010). Whilst constructing sexual dysfunction as ‘common’ the survey also 
constructs the absence of sex as a ‘problem’, presenting Viagra as the solution. Through 
constructing a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of (hetero)sexual desire as a problem, normative 
sexual function becomes unachievable without medical intervention and (a)sexuality 
becomes further marginalized (Loe 2004, Tiefer 2006).  
 
Through the deconstruction of the multi-stranded and complex socio-political context in 
which Viagra was established, it is possible to critique the attendant historical climates 
and social constructs, to enable “an awareness of the complexity, contingency, and, 
fragility of historical forms” (Smart 1983: 76). Totalizing narratives that document 
sexual ‘dysfunction’ as requiring medical intervention in order to conform to a ‘healthy’ 
and ‘normative’ standard of sexuality (that remains forever unreachable) have been 
deconstructed to provide careful critique of the ways in which a ‘crisis’ in masculinity 
has been constructed. Tracing the socio-political contexts in which Viagra was 
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established as a cultural icon has illuminated the institutional mechanisms of power and 
regulation that facilitated the marketing of Viagra as ‘necessary’ and ‘progressive’.  
 
2.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion to this chapter I have traced the medicalization of (a)sexuality in Western 
society through case studies that have explored the ‘treatments’ and ‘cures’ proposed to 
‘fix’ an ‘absence’ or ‘lack’ of (hetero)sexual desire. I have explored how the rise of 
enlightenment thinking, in hand with technological advances or ‘scientific progress’, 
created new modes of governmentality and regulation, which served to further erase and 
marginalize asexuality within medicine. The treatment of ‘hysteria’ through medical 
massage, hydrotherapy and vibrators served to regulate and manage (a)sexuality by 
writing it out of history (Foucault 1978). Through case studies surrounding hysteria and 
frigidity and the ‘cures’ proposed to ‘treat’ them, I have identified the ways in which a 
‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of (hetero)sexual desire was regulated and erased by medicine, 
which positioned treatments involving clitoral stimulation as ‘non-sexual’ due to them 
being outside of (hetero)penetrative and reproductive practices. This chapter then 
explored the shifts in ‘cures’ to a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of (hetero)sexual desire from 
“mechanical” solutions to “chemical engineering” (Brooks 2001: 55).  Through tracing 
the production and marketing of Viagra, alongside the historical climates in which it 
was established, I argued that (hetero)normative narratives of ‘the good life’ (Ahmed 
2010) have positioned anything outside of heterosexually active relationships as a 
failure. Paying attention to the construction of a ‘crisis’ in masculinity in Western 
capitalist societies that understand sex as a consumer object enabled an analysis of 
asexual’s as being positioned as ‘bad economic subjects’ (Bailey 1988, Lazzarato 
2009). Measuring an individuals worth against the economic contributions they make to 
a society has further marginalized both those who refuse to consume to Viagra to ‘fix’ 
their ‘lack’ of (hetero)sexual activity and asexuality. The following chapter turns to 
address a further shift in understandings of a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of (hetero)sexual 
desire; from physiology to psychology.   
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3. Pathologization 
This chapter provides an exploration of the Pathologization assemblage, tracing the 
historic development of categorizations of ‘medical conditions’ which have rendered 
anything outside of (hetero)penetrative sexuality pathological. I examine the ways in 
which the pathologization assemblage has contributed to the maintenance of the 
invisibility and erasure of asexuality. I deconstruct historic medical and psychiatric 
collections, referring throughout to the socio-political contexts of each works, and the 
traces of (a)sexuality that run throughout. I first turn to the 19th century works of Krafft-
Ebing (1886), as one of the first works to reference a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of sexual desire 
as a concern of science. Following the work of Krafft-Ebing (1886) I examine the works 
of Kinsey (1948, 1953) as one of the most significant contributions to works of 
sexology in the 20th century, before turning to pay significant attention to the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual (DSM) and its evolution in relation to the erasure and 
pathologization of traces of (a)sexuality. Throughout I explore the ways in which the 
affective invisibility of asexuality in the above works has shaped the landscape of more 
contemporary, and medically essentialist, conceptualisations of asexuality from Bogaert 
(2004, 2006). 
 
The pathologization of (a)sexuality has contributed significantly to the maintenance of 
the social and cultural invisibility of asexuality, exploring the ways in which historic 
assemblages have constructed asexuality and associated practices seeks to enable a 
deconstructive critique of the ways in which stigmatizing and marginalizing discourses 
have been legitimized. Pathologization marks a shift in medicalization where attentions 
shifted from the body to the mind. The pathologization of previously ‘everyday 
problems’ enabled the implementation of a form of social control through the 
disciplinary technology of listening, synonymously to Foucault’s (1989) medical gaze 
(Hook 2010). The pathologization of the psyche is a relatively recent construct, as 
Foucault (1989) highlights through tracing the historical construction of ‘mental 
illness’. Prior to the industrialisation of the 17th century madness was embraced as an 
inherent part of human subjectivity, but during the 18th century ‘madness’ became 
considered as problematic and in need of ‘cure’. From the 18th century institutions arose 
around the West in order to house those considered ‘mentally ill’ or ‘insane’ away from 
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the rest of society (Foucault 1989). It is within these institutions where Krafft-Ebing 
(1886) conducted his work, and it is also from such institutions where Kinsey (1948, 
1953) recruited his participants. I turn now to my case studies in order to further map 
the ways in which the pathologization assemblage has contributed to the (in)visibility of 
asexuality.  
3.1 Krafft-Ebing: Asexuality and Sexual Anaesthesia 	  
Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) 19th century work was one of the first to begin the structural 
reordering of sexual behaviours previously concerns of law, judicial practice, religion or 
morality, into the realm of medicine. Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) works were developed 
during a period of significant shifts in the ways in which the world was understood. 
Rose (1997: 242) considers the “argument that psy has taken the place of religion” as 
too simplistic, rather I understand religion as persisting to haunt the works of psychiatry 
and medicine. However, the declining significance of religion in the 19th century 
alongside enlightenment thinking and the rise of Darwinism promoted biological 
essentialism and a ‘survival of the fittest’ mentality, where continual ‘improvement’ 
was seen as key to the continuation of civilization. Traces of religious concern for the 
morality of sexuality remain in Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) works though: ‘proper’ sexuality 
was considered hetero-penetrative, and the aim of any sexual behaviour for Krafft-
Ebing should always and only be procreation; “everything except penetrative 
heterosexual intercourse would logically come under suspicion as abnormal or contra 
nature” (1886: 45). Marriage was deemed the “only appropriate domain for sexual 
expression” (Downing, Morland and Sullivan 2015: 47) and sexuality was still seen as a 
moral project that should be worked on, aspired towards, and should be achieved for the 
sake of civilization (Krafft-Ebing 1886). The works of Krafft-Ebing (1886) enabled the 
repackaging of the morality of sexuality that had been the concern of religion for so 
long, as belonging to the domain of the science.  
 
Krafft-Ebing was a German born psychiatrist, and is regarded as making one of the 
most significant contributions to the study of psycho-sexology (Oosterhuis 2000). The 
publication of Psychopathic Sexualis cemented him as a high profile, if controversial 
figure at the time. Krafft-Ebing (1886) worked closely with Freud, despite disagreeing 
with him on many counts, including Freud’s seduction theory, which Krafft-Ebing 
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openly dismissed as a “scientific fairly tale” (Oosterhuis 2000: 88). Krafft-Ebing (1886) 
‘branded’ his practice of psychiatry as for the upper-middle-classes who sought to 
escape asylums or mental institutions.  Prior to Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) work sexual 
‘dysfunction’ was either dismissed as insanity or treated as a religious manner, but the 
rise of biological essentialism created a discursive context where Krafft-Ebing’s work 
was taken up quiet significantly (Ooesterhuis 2000).  
 
Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) work highlights the convergence of science and religion at the 
turn of the century; he opens his work with the assertion that the continuation of 
humanity is “guaranteed by the hidden laws of nature which are enforced by a mighty, 
irresistible impulse” (1886: 1). The propagation of procreation as an innate and essential 
characteristic of normative humanity follows intellectual trends in thinking promoted by 
the rise of Darwin’s (1859) works and enlightenment thinking. Krafft-Ebing (1886) 
positions sexuality as something beyond the agency of an individual, that cannot be 
contained in any way, and is ultimately controlled by ‘nature’. In doing so the works of 
Krafft-Ebing (1886) position anything outside of pro-creative heterosexual desire, 
behaviour or attraction, as deviant, unnatural and abnormal. Flore (2015: 19) 
summarises Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) works as concluding that “life consisted of two 
primary instincts: self-preservation and sexuality”. Framing sexuality as innate, 
universal and the key to survival of civilization enabled the production of the ‘need’ to 
regulate sexual desire; Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) works catalogued and judged sexual 
characteristics from an “evolutionary perspective” (Kim 2015: 256). In tying sexuality 
to the survival of a species “the direction of one’s sexuality is made central to identity” 
(Flore 2015: 19) because to not participate in pro-creative sexual practices becomes not 
only sexually deviant, but also socially abnormal.  
 
Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) Psychopathia Sexualis contains numerous categories of sexual 
‘deviance’ and social ‘abnormalities’, but for the purposes of this genealogy I will be 
paying particular attention to the traces of contemporary (a)sexuality present within the 
categorisations of asexuality and anaesthesia sexualis. The term asexuality is used 
within Psychopathia Sexualis (Krafft-Ebing 1886) to categorise those who have been 
physically castrated before puberty. The ‘absence’ or ‘lack’ of sexual desire as a 
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consequence of genital castration before puberty is entirely permissible for Krafft-Ebing 
(1886). The argument that asexuality was a result of genital castration prior to puberty 
enabled Krafft-Ebing (1886) to argue that there was a “connection between genital 
glands, developmental phases, and sexual instinct” (Kim 2015: 256). In asserting sexual 
desire, attraction and behaviour are reliant on a ‘healthy’ and ‘functioning’ body, 
specifically the genitals; Krafft-Ebing (1886) also underlines discourses of biological 
essentialism that locates sexuality as a product of biology. Asexuality therefore becomes 
positioned as pathology of the body, something that is fixed, finite and preclusive of all 
other gendered or sexual identities. Krafft-Ebing’s (1886: 45) focus on the importance 
and ‘natural’-ness of procreation therefore positions those who are unable, unwilling or 
do not choose to reproduce, as ‘abnormal’ and “contra nature” but also as endangering 
the survival of the species.  
 
Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) definition of asexuality contains traces of contemporary 
understandings, but frames it in such a way that it remains a ‘problem’. The notion that 
(heterosexually) functioning genitals are key to normative sexual desire positions those 
who experience low sexual desire with no genital ‘abnormalities’ even further from 
normative sexuality. Through biologically essentialist and naturalist assumptions 
present in Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) works sexuality becomes rooted in the body, 
positioning ‘healthy’ levels of sexual desire and response as reliant on a ‘functioning 
body’, with disregard to identity, desire or emotion. Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) asexuality 
haunts contemporary discourses of sexuality, where genitals and sexuality are 
commonly conflated, confused or taken to be indicative of one another. Butler (1990: 
175) argues that identity is inherently disturbed by a state of constant becoming, but that 
“‘coherence’ and ‘continuity’ of ‘the person’ are not logical or analytic features of 
personhood, but, rather, socially instituted and maintained norms of intelligibility”. 
Using Butler’s (1990) work on intelligibility the conflation of genitals and sexuality can 
be understood as symptomatic of a society in which hetero-sex is privileged, because in 
order for heteronormativity to persist certain identities must not ‘exist’. Krafft-Ebing’s 
(1886) definition of asexuality also contains traces of sex-centric Western society’s 
assumption that sexual desire is innate and ‘natural’, except in bodies that appear to 
function ‘abnormally’. Contemporary understandings of sexuality are shaped and 
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produced through historical categorizations, which in turn have been shaped through the 
context in which they were developed (Cvetkovich 2003, Foucault 2003). There is a 
common assumption in contemporary Western society that those whose bodies do not 
conform to Western ideological standards of beauty, including those regarded as 
disabled, perceived to be trans, the elderly or the young, should not or do not engage in 
sexual acts or experience sexual desire (Kim 2015). The assumption that these bodies 
are not desirable and therefore should not be desired brings with it the supposition that 
‘undesirable’ individuals do not experience their own desires (Kim 2011). McRuer and 
Mollow (2012: 24) comment, “disability and sex… often threaten to unravel each 
other”. We can read Krafft-Ebings (1886) asexuality as a “buried historical trauma” that 
has become an affective form of invisibility of “everyday emotional life” (Cvetkovich 
2003: 6). In Western ableist society, sex is considered reliant on a ‘fully functioning’ 
body; if disability is present, by ableist logic, sex cannot be (McRuer and Mollow 
2012). Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) asexuality follows ableist lines of thinking that render 
‘normative’ sexuality reliant on ‘normative’ bodies (Kim 2011, McRuer and Mollow 
2012).  
 
Contemporary understandings of asexuality are perhaps more closely relatable to what 
Krafft-Ebing (1886) terms anaesthesia sexualis. Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) work separates 
asexuality (perceived to be an inhibition of the body), from anaesthesia sexualis, 
literally translated to the ‘absence of sexual feeling’. Krafft-Ebing (1886) coins the term 
‘sexual anaesthesia’ in relation to several case studies he includes of ‘patients’ who 
report experiencing little or no sexual desire. Traces of Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) are 
present within the previously discussed contemporary example of House: Better Half 
(2012) (see page 23 in Chapter 2), where House claimed, “the only people who don't 
want sex are either sick, dead or lying”. The passivity implied in Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) 
categorization of ‘sexual anaesthesia’ denotes docility and a lack of agency, in the same 
way that House’s claim that to not want sex renders you “dead” (House: Better Half 
2012). Employing the term anaesthesia removes the agency of the patient, turning them 
into an inert body and an object of medical observation (Foucault 1989).  
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Psychopathia Sexualis includes case studies of a range of ‘patients’ who presented 
themselves to Krafft-Ebing (1886: 40-41) describing experiences of “no erotic 
inclination”, an “absence of sexual instinct”, or who had “rarely enjoyed sex”. “Case 3” 
referred to as “K” is described as claiming “never to have experienced a sensual 
emotion”, Krafft-Ebing (1886: 41) comments:  
 
“K., age 29, civil servant, consulted me on account of his abnormal condition… 
Sexual life was known to him only from what he had heard other men say about 
it or from what he had read in erotic novels, which, however, had never made 
any impression upon him. He had no dislike for the opposite sex, or special 
inclination towards his own sex, and had never masturbated…excepting this 
want of sexual instinct K. considered himself to be quite normal. No physical 
defects could be detected. He was fond of solitude, but of a frigid nature, 
without interest in the arts or the beautiful, but a highly efficient and esteemed 
individual”.   
 
Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) assessment of K. ignores K’s lived experience of life without sex, 
instead focusing on the ‘lack’ of “sexual instinct” as problematic, pathological and 
something that warranted medical or psychiatric investigation. Krafft-Ebing (1886: 41) 
describes K. as being of a “frigid nature”, a phrase typically associated with women, 
suggesting K’s ‘lack’ of interest in sex has resulted in Krafft-Ebing (1886) gendering K. 
differently, coding K’s behaviour as female or feminine. Psychiatric case studies 
encapsulate Foucauldian (1990) understandings of the confession, whereby the “agency 
of domination does not reside in the one who speaks (for it is he who is constrained), 
but in the one who listens” (1990: 62). However, patient K’s confession is that he is 
“quite normal” (Krafft-Ebing 1886: 41). As with asexuality in contemporary society, K. 
must disclose details of his non-sexual behaviours so that Krafft-Ebing (1886) can 
access the ‘absence’ and categorize him accordingly. Hook (2010: 35) notes that 
through confession ‘the medical gaze’ transcends the borders of psychiatry through the 
“disciplinary technology of listening”. It is through the “disciplinary technology of 
listening” that Krafft-Ebing (1886) diminishes patient K. to a series of ‘symptoms’, 
eventually summarising his entire being in one reductive paragraph. 
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A second ‘Patient’ W. is recorded by Krafft-Ebing (1886: 41) as: 
 
“age 25, merchant, claimed to be untainted, never had a severe illness, never had 
masturbated, since his nineteenth year had but rarely pollutions, mostly without 
sensual dreams. Since his twenty first year coitus rarissimus, actus quasi 
masturbatorious, in corpore feminae, sine ulla voluptate. W. declared to have 
made these attempts solely through curiosity, and soon gave them up all together 
as desire, gratification, and ultimately even erection were wanting. He never had 
any leaning towards his own sex. His deficiency did not seem to cause him any 
worry. In the ethical and aesthetical field there were no abnormal 
manifestations.” 
 
The assessment of W. positions him as ‘deficient’ due to his low interest levels in 
sexual practices despite the patients own lack of concern in regards to his levels of 
sexual desire. Krafft-Ebing (1886: 41) remarks the patient’s levels of sexual desire “did 
not seem to cause him any worry”, making the patient’s lack of concern noteworthy and 
thus abnormal. Krafft-Ebing (1886: 41) then goes on to remark that “there were no 
abnormal manifestations” ethically or physically, as if the presence of ‘abnormal’ 
physical or ethical ‘conditions’ would adequately justify the patient’s experience of 
sexual desire.  
 
The attention paid to the ‘lack’ of physical ‘abnormalities’ reduces sexual desire to 
something that is biologically or morally determined. Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) concern 
with physiological, psychological and medical health in the patient can be tied back to 
the rise of biological essentialism and traces of religion present within his works. 
Krafft-Ebing (1886) notes that patients are physically ‘normal’ despite appearing to 
privilege their emotion over their physical responses in his notes; the sentence “desire, 
gratification, and ultimately even erection were wanting” (1886: 41) implies that Krafft-
Ebing is more concerned with the patients’ ‘lack’ of sexual desire, rather than their lack 
of physical arousal, making desire and gratification a prerequisite for erection. Despite 
the patients’ lack of concern at their ‘symptoms’, Krafft-Ebing (1886) deems them 
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worthy of examination and investigation. Krafft-Ebing (1886) notes that masturbation 
was rare and without desire towards the body of the woman. Given the time of Krafft-
Ebing’s (1886) work, to record this observation as ‘abnormal’ was controversial given 
the large quantity of medical literature and ‘cures’ proposed to treat masturbation (see 
Brodie 1845).  
 
As an aside, the duel construct of the pathologies of an ‘absence’ of masturbation 
alongside the wider social and cultural prohibitions of masturbation highlights the 
impossibility of sexual ‘norms’. To masturbate was considered to lead to impotence, 
destroy “the germ of manhood” (Brodie 1845: 10) and be an “impediment to 
procreation” (1845: 33); the only form of sex deemed non-pathological during the 18th 
Century. However, Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) case study of patient W. highlights that not 
masturbating was also considered problematic, putting the subject in a double bind of 
either being categorized as ‘suffering’ from Anesthesia Sexualis or being considered 
impotent and have “an incapacity for entering into the marriage state” (Brodie 1845: 
12).  
 
The inclusion of instances of “rarely enjoy[ing] sex” in works which address sexual 
pathologies implies that “rarely” (or never) enjoying sex is problematic, and something 
that warrants remedy or cure (Krafft-Ebing 1886: 41). Foucault’s (1989) ‘medical gaze’ 
enables Krafft-Ebing (1886) to ignore the individual differences of identity and life 
experience (absently) present within patients K and W, instead perceiving them as sets 
of pathological symptoms and categorizing them as ‘suffering’ from “anaesthesia 
sexualis”. However, Krafft-Ebing (1886) argues the experiences categorized as ‘sexual 
anaesthesia’ are completely ‘natural’ in both children and elder adults; sexual desire in 
the elderly or young also becomes pathologized, and is referred to as paradoxia. Here, 
Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) work sits in contradiction to Freud (1975) who understood 
sexuality as a normative part of children’s social and psychological development. 
However, in Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) work whilst sexuality is constructed as ‘natural’, an 
‘impulse’, and moral obligation, it is ‘natural’ only within hetero-penetrative 
frameworks that facilitate reproduction.  
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The reduction of instances of (a)sexuality or any sexual experience that transgresses 
hetero-sex-centric narratives to a series of symptoms that are framed as pathological 
persists to haunt contemporary conceptualisations of (a)sexuality, merging “the visible 
and the invisible, the tangible and the ungraspable, creating the particular form of 
affective sociality of living with ghosts” (Gordon 1997: 195).  Black (2011) uses the 
work of Gordon (1997) to argue that prisoners are ‘living ghosts’ presided over by legal 
institutions and disciplinary power structures that have rendered them part of a haunted 
category. The affect of psychiatry can be viewed as acting synonymously on sexualities 
that exist outside of the normative model of hetero-penetrative, procreative sex. 
Through psychiatry (a)sexuality becomes a prisoner of the body, heteronormative 
institutions, histories, and disciplinary technologies that have silenced anything outside 
of hetero-sex (Black 2011, Foucault 1977). Black (2011: 8) argues for the 
acknowledgment of haunting as a relation and resource for hope that is alive through 
repression and situations of “unfreedom”. Black’s (2011) interpretations of Gordon 
(1997) enables a re-presentation of the silencing of (a)sexual experiences through 
psychiatry. (A)sexual histories do not become understood as ‘lacking’ or ‘absent’ but 
can instead be reconceptualised as transformative and “connected to a situation in the 
present as it moves towards the future” (Black 2011: 8). Following the above 
exploration of Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) late 19th century work, I now turn to assess 
Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) research as one of the most significant contributions to sexology 
in the 20th century. 
 
3.2 Kinsey’s ‘X’	  
In the following subsection I now turn to examine Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) research on 
human sexual behaviour. Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) work was part of a 20th century trend in 
behaviourism, in which behaviour became privileged over identity, emotion and other 
forms of expression. Behaviourism encouraged psychology and other psycho-medical 
practices to concern themselves with that which they could observe, and marked a 
major shift in intellectual thinking within the field. The Kinsey Reports (1948, 1953) 
were a product of this shift to behaviourism within the field of psychology. Kinsey’s 
(1948, 1953) works gathered data from a huge number of participants, all of whom were 
white American. Data was collected (according to The Kinsey Institute 2015) through in 
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depth interviews, where up to 516 questions about sexual history and behaviour were 
asked to participants. The emphasis on sexual behaviour disregarded emotion, fantasy, 
or any factor outside of physiology as a direct response to rising trends in behaviourism 
at the time, sitting in contrast to Krafft-Ebings (1886) implied privileging of desire over 
physical response (see pages 41-48 in the previous subsection).  There have been a 
number of public criticisms of the Kinsey Reports (1948, 1953) ranging from 
allegations of biased sampling to those of rape and paedophilia occurring under 
Kinsey’s supervision (see Jones 1997, Reisman 1990). Reisman’s (1990) criticism of 
Kinsey has become a lifelong work, with her establishing an ‘Anti-Kinsey Movement’ 
as a direct result. The majority of Reisman’s (1990) criticisms focus on undermining 
Kinsey’s conclusions, which sought to establish homosexuality as ‘natural’ rather than 
the ethical problems of Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) works, and are notably supported by the 
Christian Salvo magazine, a conservative Christian U.S. based magazine. 
 
As with Krafft-Ebing (1886), Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) works were introduced as being of 
service to the medical profession; the framing of Kinsey’s work as ‘scientific’ and 
integral to medical advancement permitted Kinsey (1948, 1953) to investigate 
previously taboo topics, under the pretence of their necessity to scientific development 
(Nardi 1998).  
 
Kinsey (1948, 1953) considered sexuality to be fluid, and plotted a seven-point scale to 
visualise this, with heterosexuality plotted with a value of 0 and homosexuality plotted 
with a value of 6. Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) scale constructed homosexuality and 
heterosexuality as innately opposite, despite acknowledging they were changeable and 
not preclusive of each other. Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) participants were assigned a number 
on the scale on the basis of their sexual activity. The value of 0 was assigned to those 
who recounted exclusively heterosexual responses, 1 to those who recalled ‘only 
incidentally’ homosexual responses, 2 to those who confirmed ‘more than incidental’ 
homosexual behaviours, 3 to those who Kinsey (1948, 1953) deemed to show ‘equally’ 
heterosexual and homosexual responses, 4 to those who responded with ‘more than 
incidental’ heterosexual behaviours, 5 to those who Kinsey deemed exhibited ‘only 
incidentally’ heterosexual responses, and 6 to those who Kinsey defined as 
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‘exclusively’ homosexual. The use of the word ‘incidental’ suggests that Kinsey (1948, 
1953) thought of sexuality in terms of discrete acts, or ‘incidents’, and emphasises his 
privileging of behaviour over identity or desires. Kinsey (1948, 1953) gave the value of 
‘X’ to those who he deemed to have recalled an ‘absence’ of sexual response. ‘X’ 
participants remained un-plotted on the Kinsey scale (See Fig. 2), reiterating the 
medical opinion that a ‘lack’ of sexual response is a problem, and for Kinsey (1948, 










Figure 2. Kinsey Scale (Hille 2014) 
 
There is no account of what Kinsey (1948, 1953) understood to be heterosexual or 
homosexual stimuli, although it has been suggested by a number of sources (see Jones 
1997, Reisman 1990) that stimuli may have included pornography or explicit sexual 
contact with researchers. Kinsey described ‘X’ patrticipants as those who did “not 
respond erotically to either heterosexual or homosexual stimuli” (Kinsey 1953: 472). 
Whilst participants categorized as ‘X’, who did not respond to this ‘stimuli’, were not 
recorded on the ‘Kinsey Scale’ (See Fig. 2), they did feature in Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) 
tables of results (See Fig. 3). Participants categorized as ‘X’ were given little mention in 
Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) analysis or discussion of results, and were regarded as needing 
further research, as an ‘anomoly’. The value of ‘X’ was assigned by Kinsey (1948, 
1953) on the basis of their accounts of (or researchers accounts of) physical response or 
behaviour: neglecting participants identity, attractions and desires.  
 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The 
unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed in the Lanchester 
Library Coventry University.
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Przybylo (2012: 227) argues that Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) works “did not provide 
asexuality with any real territory”, and so places it outside the assemblages which could 
otherwise territorialize bodies’, variously restricting and enableing what a body can do 
or become. But asexuality does move throught the assembelage (Deleuze 1987, Fox 
2012). I argue that asexuality moves through assemblages of medicalization, 
pathologization and politicization as a trace of a node, with an agency of its own. We 
can understand Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) reports as containing traces of (a)sexuality that 
both restrict the shape of it, through the exclusion of X participants from the ‘Kinsey 
Scale’, and open up possibilities of asexuality, through ‘X’ participants 
acknowledgement in Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) tables of results. There is territory here, if 
one shaped by uncertainty - needing further research - and, ultimately, absence. The 
absence of participants categorized as ‘X’ in the ‘Kinsey Scale’ (See Fig. 2) means 
Kinsey (1948, 1953) fails to give asexuality any legitimacy, and locates asexuality as 




Figure 3. Kinsey ‘Summary and Comparisons’ Table (Kinsey 1953: 488) 
 
Kinsey (1948, 1953) argues towards an understanding of sexuality as fluid, a concept 
that had previously remained unspeakable due to Western discourses of sexuality that 
were heavily influenced by religion and biological essentialism. However, Kinsey’s 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis 
can be viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
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(1948, 1953) persistent argument that sexuality should be considered fluid still 
understood sexual attraction and desire as inherent. For Frers (2013: 433) the presence 
of sexual fluidity in Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) works would highlight that the 
“presence…can only be a failure, a gap” (Frers 2013: 433). By excluding participants 
given a value of ‘X’ from the Kinsey scale (See Fig. 2) it is suggested that (a)sexuality, 
or ‘X’ participants, cannot be fluid, that there is no space for sexual fluidity when an 
‘absence’ or ‘lack’ of sexual desire is present.  Kinsey (1948, 1953) thereby ignores any 
possibility of sexuality outside of physical response or interaction and confines 
sexuality to sexual practice, as well as discounting the experiences of participants 
labelled ‘X’.  
 
Analysing Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) works using Derrida’s (1993) notion of the trace, it 
can be argued that the negligence of ‘X’ participants, and the absence of discussion 
around their presence, could be seen as a strategic response to societal discourses. 
Derrida’s (1993, 1976) work argued that silence could be seen as a strategic response to 
discourses. As Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) research attempted to confront persistent Western 
discourses of homosexuality as pathological, as well as Western assumptions that 
females had inherently lower sexual responses, ignoring participants who challenged 
Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) ideas can be read as a strategic response by Kinsey to socio-
political discourses at the time (Derrida 1993, Przybylo 2012). In order for Kinsey 
(1948, 1953) to advance his agenda to ‘prove’ homosexuality to be ‘natural’ and to 
demonstrate the existence of female sexual desire, Kinsey (1948, 1953) sidelined the 
high frequency of female ‘X’ participants, as they did not support his argument. 
Downing, Morland and Sullivan (2015) detail Western understandings of sexuality in 
the 19th century as heavily influenced by religion, and thus a moral project (see page 24 
on the rise of enlightenment thinking). In response to discourses of sexuality as a moral 
project that should be worked on in order to be a good Christian subject, Kinsey (1948, 
1953) attempts to position sexuality both as fluid and as innate or ‘natural’, something 
that should be embraced rather than ‘worked on’. We can therefore understand Kinsey’s 
(1948, 1953) erasure of participants given a value of ‘X’ as a strategic response to 
socio-cultural discourses shaped by enlightenment thinking and behaviourism; 
generating culturally specific sexual knowledges (Derrida 1993, Fox and Alldred 2013). 
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In the following subsection I will explore how the historic erasure of (a)sexuality from 
the pathologization assemblage has continued to haunt contemporary psychiatric 
discourse through the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. 
3.3 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual	  
In order to explore how the historic pathologization of (a)sexuality continues to haunt 
contemporary lived experiences, I now turn to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM). The DSM has come to be a legitimate discourse, which large 
portions of Western society subscribe to. As a result, the ways the DSM addresses 
asexuality has a significant impact on its visibility and how contemporary asexuality is 
shaped. I further explore the evolution of diagnostic criteria and categories of ‘sexual 
disorders’ to provide an account of how the pathologization of asexuality can be traced 
historically. I deconstruct the emergence of diagnostic criteria in the DSM, following 
Dauenhauer’s (1980: 119) call to reconceptualise what is “seen, heard, and read”, in 
order to “listen” to the resistance of silent discourses. 
 
The DSM has been established as a definitive institutional discourse since the 1950’s. 
Originally developed in the aftermath of World War II out of the U.S. military 
classification scheme ‘Medical 203’, the DSM was created to provide a unifying list of 
psychological diagnoses in the wake of several differing systems of classification. The 
DSM has been constructed through the dominant discourses of the late 19th and 20th 
centuries that proliferated narratives of science, enlightenment and reason as ‘progress’. 
Advances in technology throughout the 20th century led to ‘progress’ being defined as 
scientific. The DSM was established during the same decade as the development of the 
atomic bomb, the space race and the first computer, and through its affiliation with 
science and biomedicine the DSM came to exercise authority and influence over “what 
counts – what gets recognized and legitimized – as ‘healthy’ and ‘normal’” (Potts 2002: 
15). Through the unification of diagnostic criteria and categorization of psychological 
‘disorders’ the DSM intended to create a universal field of language to communicate 
within the discipline of psychiatric medicine. However, the DSM has been repeatedly 
revised since its first publication in a continued attempt to resolve discrepancies in 
interpretation and is currently in its 5th edition. The DSM serves to categorize and 
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pathologize Western populations, resulting in a self-regulatory society that is more 
easily managed (Foucault 1989).  
 
For Foucault (1978: 116) medical and psychiatric models were directed towards “frauds 
against procreation”, or anyone that did not pursue hetero-penetrative and monogamous 
sexuality, and were purposed to “protect morality” (Flore 2014: 42). Foucault (1978: 
31) argues that the construction of sexual dysfunctions as pathological has “radiated 
discourses aimed at sex, intensifying people’s awareness of it as a constant danger”.  
 
The DSM serves to enable the institutionalization of self-regulation, through extensive 
categorization and what Foucault (1989) dubs ‘the medical gaze’. For example current 
diagnostic criteria and treatment guidelines for ‘Gender Dysphoria’ ensures the self-
regulation of trans identified individuals and the maintenance of the gender binary 
through diagnostic criteria which calls for a ‘marked difference’ to be present between 
an individuals ‘expressed’ gender and their gender assigned at birth. In doing so the 
DSM paved the way for treatment criteria that asserts individuals must demonstrate they 
are capable of sustaining social and economic ‘functionality’ in their chosen gender 
before accessing ‘medical’ treatment plans. In the Western context there is a continued 
assertion that trans ‘patients’ cannot undertake any form of body modification without 
psychiatric approval and adequate evidence that they are both working and socialising 
at a ‘required’ level.  
 
Diagnostic criteria and requirements for treatment ensure a self-regulatory patient body. 
In order to access ‘treatment’ individuals must fulfil a certain number of diagnostic 
criteria, and demonstrate the eligibility for diagnosis, and in turn treatment, in a way 
that is predefined by the DSM. For Foucault (1977: 136) therefore the self-regulation 
enabled through the DSM serves to mould subjects “out of a formless clay” into more 
economically valuable, “more obedient” and “more useful” subjects in order to 
propagate a self-sustaining society, requiring less time and resources to manage itself. 
In the case of ‘Gender Dysphoria’ the DSM’s diagnostic criteria and the treatment 
criteria that evolve from them ensure the preservation of the gender binary, normative 
gender roles and patriarchal structures in Western society. The DSM reduces people to a 
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series of symptoms, systematically ignoring individual agency and the multiplicity of 
identity; progressively eliminating social deviancy. The DSM therefore both produces 
and is produced by socio-cultural discourses, constructing the ‘patient’ as devoid of 
agency and pathological (Foucault 1989). The disregard of difference in social, 
psychological, or physical identity in the DSM is problematic for Butler (1993), who 
argues identities continually fail because we are continually undone by both ourselves 
and others.  
 
By providing an ever-increasing list of psychiatric, sexual or social ‘dysfunctions’, the 
DSM constructs the most mundane of human experiences as pathological, and imposes 
limits on ‘appropriate’ sexuality (Fox and Alldred 2013). From a Deleuzian (1987) 
perspective, the DSM serves as a point within an assemblage, which directs “the 
[sexual] capacities produced in bodies” (Fox and Alldred 2013: 770). The 
pathologization assemblage territorializes a body’s desires, simultaneously restricting 
the shape of sexuality, as well as rendering it infinitely varied (Fox and Alldred 2013). 
The ever-increasing list of sexual ‘dysfunctions’ within the DSM both increasingly 
limits what ‘normative’ sexuality can be understood to be, and simultaneously creates 
numerous possibilities for legitimate forms of sexual expression (albeit ‘disordered’). 
For example, the DSM V (American Psychiatric Association 2013: 433) recommends a 
diagnosis of Female Sexual Interest/Arousal Disorder if an individual has “little interest 
in sex”, “few thoughts relating to sex”, “decreased start and rejecting of sex”, “little 
pleasure during sex most of the time”, “deceased interest in sex even when exposed to 
erotic stimuli” or “little genital sensations during sex most of the time”. The diagnostic 
criteria both legitimizes a ‘lack’ of interest in sex for women, and reterritorializes the 
experience as a disorder in need of a ‘cure’. For Thrift (2004: 61) because within 
assemblages each part has the capacity both to affect and be affected, territorialisation 
and reterritorialisation create a state of perpetual “becoming”.  
 
Through diagnoses of ‘sexual disorders’ the DSM has enforced the essentialist notions 
that sexual desire and attraction are innate and ‘natural’. The DSM has been of huge 
significance in propagating the pervasive stigmatization and pathologization of those 
who don’t experience sexual desire, experience low levels of sexual desire, or 
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experience sexual desire in non-‘normative’ ways. For example, the American 
Psychiatric Association classified homosexuality as a ‘sexual disorder’ and thus ‘mental 
illness’ until 1973 (Bayer 1987). Through the DSMs framing of ‘normative’ sexuality 
as hetero-penetrative, those engaging in non-‘normative’ sexual practices, or not 
engaging in sex at all, are implied to be less valuable and worthy members of society 
(Flore 2014: 45).  
 
Traces of (a)sexuality have been present in the DSM since its first edition, but the DSM 
III was the first edition where ‘symptoms’ that could be likened to contemporary 
asexuality were presented as an entirely separate disorder; ‘Inhibited Sexual Desire’ 
within the ‘Psychosexual Disorders’ subsection (American Psychiatric Association 
1980, Hinderliter 2015). The DSM III was compiled during a period of significant 
criticism of psychiatry more broadly (Angel 2012). Work from the Anti-Psychiatry 
Movement (See Laing (1964, 1960) and Goffman (1961)) was gaining attention and 
being taken up more widely in popular discourse, and there were substantial concerns 
raised around the amount of space left for interpretation in DSM diagnostic criteria, that 
had led to allegations of multiple discrepancies in diagnoses between psychiatric 
practitioners (Angel 2012). As a result of these criticisms there was a conscious effort to 
provide more quantifiable diagnostic criteria in the DSM III and attempted to root 
diagnosis in ‘medically observable’ or biological and physiological terms as opposed to 
the psyche (Angel 2012). Despite their attempts to provide clearer diagnostic criteria in 
the DSM III, they remained suitably vague for ‘Inhibited Sexual Desire Disorder’ 
requiring the practitioner use their own judgement about how factors including the 
patients’ age, circumstances and lifestyle may influence their behaviour or feelings 
before issuing a diagnosis (Morrison and Bellack 1987). The only requirement given 
was that the individual had a “persistent global inhibition of sexual desire” (Morrison 
and Bellack 1987: 97). Morrison and Bellack (1987) indicate that treatments for 
‘Inhibited Sexual Desire Disorder’ at the time may have included low doses of 
testosterone, however treatments are not discussed at all in the vast majority of related 
literature.  Kaplan (1979) suggested that the response to treatment was substantially 
poorer in cases of ‘Inhibited Sexual Desire’ than it was in treatments for ‘Inhibited 
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Orgasm’, but does not reflect on why she felt ‘Inhibited Sexual Desire’ was necessary to 
treat, or why these differences in effectiveness might be present.  
 
In the DSM III-R (the revised version of the DSM III) ‘Inhibited Sexual Desire’ was 
reclassified as ‘Sexual Desire Disorders’ and divided into ‘Sexual Aversion Disorder’ 
for men and ‘Female Sexual Arousal Disorder’ for women, due to concerns that 
‘Inhibited Sexual Desire’ gave the impression of psychodynamic aetiology that was 
under critique at the time (American Psychiatric Association 1987, Hinderliter 2015). 
The overarching category of ‘Psychosexual Dysfunctions’ was also replaced with 
‘Sexual Dysfunctions’ in order to continue to distance the DSM from the on-going 
controversy in regards to psychiatry and psychoanalysis. The gendered diagnoses 
present within the DSM III-R uphold hegemonic standards of masculinity through their 
gendered categorizations. ‘Female Sexual Arousal Disorder’ implies that it is not 
possible for men to ‘lack’ sexual arousal, instead positioning a ‘lack’ of sexual desire 
for men as ‘Sexual Aversion Disorder’. These categorizations assume an innate sexual 
desire in men, and that any decision or inability to fulfil these desires must be as a result 
of an ‘aversion’ to sex, rather than a lack of interest or arousal, again placing asexuality 
under erasure. 
 
In the DSM IV the diagnostic criteria shifted again for both ‘Sexual Aversion Disorder’ 
and ‘Female Sexual Arousal Disorder’, so that ‘patients’ must experience direct 
“distress or interpersonal difficulty” as a result of a ‘lack’ of sexual desire (American 
Psychiatric Association 1994: NP). The publication of the DSM IV coincided with the 
accidental discovery that Sildenafil could evoke penile erections; Sildenafil went on to 
be marketed by Pfizer as Viagra (see pages 34-39 for further discussion of Viagra) and 
to be prescribed to treat erectile dysfunction. By maintaining the gendered separation of 
categorizations Viagra’s gendered audience was already predefined by the DSM IV.  
 
The most recent edition of the DSM (DSM V), still features gender divisive diagnoses, 
‘Female Sexual Arousal Disorder’ (FSAD) remains for women, but ‘Sexual Aversion 
Disorder’ has been re-categorized as ‘Hypo-active Sexual Desire Disorder’ (HSDD) for 
men (American Psychiatric Association 2013, Brotto 2010).  Both diagnoses share 
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considerable similarities with definitions of asexuality given by the Asexual Visibility 
and Education Network, an online community of self-identified asexuals (the Asexuality 
Visibility and Education Network is discussed in more depth in Chapter 4). Diagnostic 
criteria for each disorder have been altered to include a sub-clause exempting self-
defined asexuals from diagnosis (Brotto 2010). The amended diagnostic criteria indicate 
that a diagnosis of either disorder should not be made if the individual acknowledges 
that a “lifelong” lack of sexual desire is “better explained by one’s self-identification as 
‘asexual’” (American Psychiatric Association 2013: 434). Through the addition of a 
disclaimer that prevents a diagnosis of HSDD or FSIAD if the individual identifies as 
asexual, asexuality becomes something to be confessed, in order for society and the 
clinician to measure the extent to which that ‘patient’ is ‘truly’ asexual. Foucault (1960: 
65) summarises that the “agency of domination does not reside in the one who speaks 
(for it is he who is constrained), but in the one who listens and says nothing”.  For Hook 
(2010) it is through psychiatrist and the notion of the ‘confession’ that listening 
becomes a disciplinary technology, functioning synonymously with Foucault’s (1989) 
‘medical gaze’, to reduce the patient to a series of symptoms or pathologies. Despite the 
impossibility of measuring desire, the DSM persists to argue that FSIAD and MHSDD 
can be “calculated, fixed and treated” (Flore 2014: 45), ignoring the social, 
psychological and cultural contexts of (a)sexual expression, experience and emotional 
response (Cerankowski and Milks 2014).  
 
Bogeart (2008) and Brotto and Yule (2010) generally agree that asexuality can be 
differentiated from HSDD and FSAD because asexual identified individuals are not 
distressed by their ‘lack’ of sexual desire, but Bogeart (2008) and Brotto and Yule 
(2010) both disregard the fact that identifying with a relatively invisible label could 
cause distress in and of itself, and that given the relative invisibility of asexuality many 
people diagnosed with HSDD or FSAD may not even know of its existence (Carrigan 
2011).  
 
The DSM V distances asexuality from the medical model and presents an asexual 
identity as stable, fixed and without potential for fluidity, despite a clear refusal of such 
notions within the asexual community (Carrigan 2011, Przybylo 2011, Scherrer 2008). 
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Through distancing asexuality from the medical model, the DSM V creates a binary 
differentiation between those who are asexual and those who are not. The DSM 
suggests that you cannot have a sexual dysfunction if you identify as asexual, by 
positioning a diagnosis of FSIAD or HSDD as impossible when an individual identifies 
as asexual. The dismissal of a diagnosis of FSIAD or HSDD when the individual self-
identifies as asexual pathologizes asexual practices and simultaneously creates a further 
erasure of asexual identity: that is to say, asexual practices, or an expression of a ‘lack’ 
of sexual desire or attraction, are pathologized through the diagnoses of FSIAD and 
HSDD, which on paper reflect the practices expressed by much of the asexual 
community, whilst the DSM’s clause at the same time prohibits a diagnosis of FSIAD 
or HSDD for self-identified asexuals, and so erases asexuality further. The DSM 
positions asexuality as something both pathological and almost non-existent 
simultaneously, unlike homosexuality which was both pathologized and legitimized by 
the DSM naming it, asexuality does not gain legitimacy through the DSM’s recognition 
of it due to the DSM positioning asexuality as an identity category, rather than 
something innate. The tension present in the DSM, also plays out in the contemporary 
asexual community on the AVEN, where there is a push to legitimize asexuality 
through claiming it as an innate and preclusive sexual orientation and yet also a pressure 
to complicate contemporary asexuality and its definition in order to be as inclusive as 
possible (see further discussion on pages 75-81). 
 
The DSM neglects asexuality in its categorizations of ‘appropriate sexuality’, and in the 
most recent edition explicitly excludes asexuality from its seemingly exhaustive list of 
sexual dysfunction. Through the DSM asexuality becomes doubly erased, not only is 
asexuality understood through the DSM as a refusal of heterosexuality in a 
heteronormative society, but also as a refusal of the DSM’s conception of sexuality and 
‘sexual function’ all together.  
 
3.4 Conclusion	  
Where Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) concern was with reproduction or rather with 
‘perversions’ that prevented it, Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) concerns lay with orgasm. 
Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) works neglect ethical, social or emotional factors and isolates 
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‘orgasm’ as the subject, relegating ‘sexual perversions’ to psychiatry (Potts 2002). 
Where Krafft-Ebing (1886) locates naturalness in reproductive sex, Kinsey (1948, 
1953) locates ‘naturalness’ in sexual behaviour, or orgasm (Potts 2002). In turn Krafft-
Ebing (1886) pathologizes (a)sexuality through his categorizations of anesthesia 
sexualis, and asexuality, where individuals who experience little or no sexual desire are 
regarded as either worthy of psychiatric study, and thus ‘ill’, or as having physiological 
abnormalities; where as Kinsey (1948, 1953) erases (a)sexuality on his scale of sexual 
response, leaving only its trace in the form of ‘X’ participants included in his tables. 
Both the works of Kinsey (1948, 1953) and Krafft-Ebing (1886) have persisted to haunt 
the DSM. The DSM V distances asexuality from the medical model in the same way 
that Kinsey (1948, 1953) refuses to analyse the results of ‘X’ participants despite their 
prevalence, by refusing to legitimise its existence in its most recent diagnostic criteria. 
The DSM V lists two gendered ‘sexual dysfunctions’ that are similar to the experiences 
of participants Kinsey (1948, 1953) records as ‘X’, and Krafft-Ebing (1886) categorizes 
as ‘suffering’ from anesthesia sexualis. By refusing to acknowledge asexuality as 
something innate, the DSM V renders asexuality an identity category, outside of 
Western medical discourses of legitimacy, and thus doubly erased.   
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4. Politicization 
In the following chapter I intend to explore the absent presence of (a)sexuality in socio-
political moments involved in visibility advocacy. I argue asexuality’s erasure from 
these contexts has come to be through the climates and discourses of the 1960s and 
1970s, which have silenced (a)sexuality’s resistant potential in capitalist Western 
society. I turn first to examine how we tell liberation stories, drawing on the work of 
Hemmings (2005) and Plummer (1995) to explore the ways in which stories of 
liberation have come to be told in a cohesive and unified manner, and how we might go 
about telling them differently. Political movements are often held up as defining 
moments of a community and have been retold many times in multiple forms, but the 
proliferating stories of social movements are often rose-tinted and gloss over or ignore 
integral foundational moments, the erasure or increased marginalization of others, or 
disregard the unintended implications outcomes have on others. 
 
Using the work of Hemmings (2005) and Plummer (1995) alongside my 
methodological framework (See Chapter 1) I then turn to a case study focusing on the 
gay liberation movement, followed by a discussion of feminist movements and the ways 
in which their narratives have shaped contemporary understandings of asexuality. I will 
then move to the current period to address contemporary asexuality through the 
Asexuality Visibility and Education Network (AVEN) and the asexual movement that 
has evolved alongside it. I recognise the case studies included in this chapter are both 
complex and multifaceted, and due to the constraints of the thesis I address only parts of 
the assemblage where I can through my limited case studies, but I argue the parts of 
case studies presented can be taken a representative of wider socio-cultural responses to 
discourses during the mid to late 19th Century.  
 
4.1 Telling Liberation Stories	  
Stories of liberation have come to be remembered, told and re-told, as cohesive and 
linear narratives, which gloss over or ignore instances and moments that disrupt their 
linearity, but are also affective and have the ability to move us (Hemmings 2005). 
Plummer (1995) discusses narratives of coming to a marginalized identity as part of 
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establishing not only a sense of self, but also a connection in relation to a wider world 
or community; as hooks (1989: 43) has noted “oppressed people resist by identifying 
themselves as subjects, by defining their reality, shaping their new identity, naming 
their history, telling their story”. Weeks (1991) contended that a quest for identity has 
been hugely significant to those marginalized by Western norms, especially for those 
labelled as sexually deviant. In this sense telling stories for Plummer (1995) becomes a 
way not only to identify yourself, but also to identify yourself in relation to others and 
the world around you.  
 
Examining the work of Weeks (1991), hooks (1989) and Plummer (1995) it becomes 
increasingly evident as to why the repetition of the same liberation stories has become 
commonplace in contemporary Western society. Through the repetition of liberation 
stories, such as the Stone Wall Inn riots of 1969, or Feminist bra burning, gendered and 
sexual minorities of the past century have enabled the solidification of an identity that 
has been the subject of infinite question and scrutiny in Western society. Plummer 
stated “a crucial strategy of story telling is the creation of a sense of past which helps to 
provide continuity and order over the flux of the present” (1995: 40). But in repeating 
the same liberation stories we position history against the present just by naming it, and 
in telling the same liberation stories we “lay down routes to a coherent past, mark of 
boundaries” (Plummer 1995: 172 emphasis in original), simplifying the differences and 
discarding what is deemed unimportant or that which interrupts the linear progress of 
narratives (Hemmings 2005). This chapter will consider the ways in which boundaries 
have been marked off, erasing asexuality from liberation stories due to its troubling not 
only of heterosex, but also of other penetration-centric critiques of sexual politics. 
 
Liberation stories can be understood to “lead the tellers in some directions and not 
others” (Plummer 1995: 173). It is these ‘other’ directions that my research is concerned 
with exploring; not to privilege them over the histories that we already know so well, 
but to pay attention to the multiplicity present within history. As outlined in my 
methodology (see Chapter 1), I take a genealogical approach, not in the hope of 
discovering the ‘real’ ‘truth’ of any given moment, movement, or approach, but to 
provide a critical account of familiar histories where (a)sexuality has become an absent 
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presence through its erasure. Hemmings (2005: 118) highlights that by acknowledging, 
“there is no single historical truth” we do not have to understand history as “simply a 
matter of individual opinion” or consider “all truths… somehow equal”. Rather, we 
should be conscious that the multiplicity of historical truths might enable an awareness 
of political responsibility in contemporary society (Spivak 1999).  
 
Plummer describes stories being constructed from a series of ‘props’, and that these 
“‘props’ are deposited in a trail behind” as “a life is lived” (1995: 36-37). The trace of 
(a)sexuality can therefore be understood as a series of ‘props’ that have been left behind 
throughout history, that are now used to construct contemporary stories of asexuality. 
Each ‘prop’ takes the shape of a node within the assemblages, moving through them at 
each point shifting and changing the shape of the assemblages that they exist within. 
Considering asexuality as the trace of a node within the assemblages of medicalization, 
pathologization and politicization that work to erase asexuality, we could understand 
these traces of nodes as manifesting themselves as props that interact, affect, and 
transform both the shape and trajectory of asexuality. It is the litany of ‘props’ within 
each assemblage enables the heterogeneity and instability of contemporary asexual 
identities, and the stories that they are constructed around.  
 
In the following chapter therefore I intend to examine the “props” (Plummer 1995: 36-
37) that are left as a trace behind the stories of liberation movements that we are told. In 
doing so I intend to explore why these stories are told, where the traces of asexuality 
have become an absent presence in liberation stories, and how liberation stories have 
shaped contemporary asexuality (Hemmings 2005, Plummer 1995, Spivak 1999). As 
Hemmings (2005: 119) argues, “my primary aim is to open up future possibilities” for 
asexuality “rather than dwelling on past omissions”. I consider the genealogical 
excavation of “past omissions” (Hemmings 2005: 119) as the means to consider what 
possibilities these “props” (Plummer 1995: 36), or traces (Derrida 1976), of asexuality 
might open up for Western heteronormative society.  
4.2 Gay Liberation Movement	  
Robinson (2003:1) argues “gay history has developed against…silences”, it is the silent 
moments of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and other sexual or gendered minorities 
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(LGBT+) history’s that I intend to explore in the following section. LGBT+ movements 
have a long and extensive history, dating back to well before the narratives of sexual 
liberation in the 1960s and 1970s that we have become so familiar with. I start this 
subsection with a discussion of the Boston marriages of the early 19th century (Kahan 
2013, Scott and Dawson 2014), to complicate normative narratives of LGBT+ 
movements before turning to address some of the most prominent groups within the gay 
liberation movement of the late 1960’s. It is recognised that the movements covered in 
this subsection largely centre on gay men in a Western context, despite often being 
presented or remembered as representative of the wider LGBT+ community; I use this 
Chapter to tease apart some of the convolution that arise from this ‘misremembering’. 
For the purposes of this analysis, I will primarily focusing on the gay liberation 
movement in America, as America is also where AVEN was established. I acknowledge 
that there are voices and identities that are further marginalized by the decision to focus 
on American social movements, however, as the contemporary asexual community on 
AVEN is understood to be largely White-American, in tracing its history I have sought 
out moments when it has been erased from its own context. 
 
Through exploring the silences present within LGBT+ histories I seek to trace the ways 
in which (a)sexuality has been erased from the dominant narratives of sexual liberation 
and remained (in)visible despite the emergence of a visible LGBT+ movement where a 
‘lack’ of (hetero)sexuality is also present (Love 2009). Love (2009) argued that there is 
“a tendency to read the queerness of queer desire as excess rather than lack, but it would 
also make sense to understand queerness as an absence of or aversion to sex”. Love 
(2009) describes queerness as being able to be conceptualised as a ‘lack’ of sex (when 
sex is understood to be heteronormative), much in the same way that (a)sexuality is 
understood in contemporary Western society as a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’. The ‘lack’ of 
heteronormativity present within both queerness and (a)sexuality provides sufficient 
grounds to draw on the gay liberation movement for my next case study tracing 
asexuality. Throughout the 1960s social liberation movements located the body as a site 
of political struggle, and marked sexuality as holding the potential for emancipation 
(Fahs 2010).  
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Before turning to examine the gay liberation movement in America, as an aside, I first 
want to discuss the Boston marriages of the late 19th century in order to complicate the 
taken-for-granted history of LGBT+ movements ‘beginning’ during the 1960s. The 
phrase ‘Boston marriages’ has been used to describe the long-term partnerships between 
women who lived together. There has been considerable debate on whether these 
relationships were celibate or sexual, complicated by the medical discourses discussed 
in Chapter 2 that positioned ‘sex’ as only being possible between a husband and wife 
(Foucault 1978, Kahan 2013). Kahan has argued that the debate between whether 
Boston marriages should be considered celibate or lesbian relationships is unhelpful, 
suggesting instead, that regardless of the practices of women involved these 
relationships, they can be understood to “share a social identity with celibacy” (2013: 
41). The claiming of Boston marriages as lesbian relationships could be understood as 
an erasure of (a)sexual practices, by contemporary Western LGBT+ movements. 
However, the Boston marriages indicate one of the earliest instances of a social and 
political rejection of the institution of marriage in Western society, where Boston 
marriages provided one of the only options for women to have social and economic 
independence from men (Kahan 2013).  
 
Armstrong and Crage (2006) argue that the Stonewall riots of 1969 are often heralded 
as the pivotal moment of LGBT+ history. On the 27th of June 1969 New York police 
raided the Stonewall Inn as part of an on-going operation targeting the unlicensed 
selling of alcohol; police frequently targeted so-called ‘deviant’ bars or venues during 
raids. However, on this occasion patrons of the Stonewall Inn decided to resist arrest 
and sparking a riot. The Stonewall riots were not the first instance of LGBT+ resistance 
during police raids, nor were they the first to spark social or political organization in 
their aftermath. However, others have failed to be remembered in the same way 
(Armstong and Crage 2006, Hall 2008). As Weeks (2007: 19) argues, the emphasis on 
the Stonewall riots has made it “impossible to think of ways of being non-heterosexual 
today which cannot trace their roots back to the emergence of gay liberation after 
1969”. I therefore turn to address the political organization and social change that 
emerged following the Stonewall riots, to examine the ways in which the gay liberation 
movements have simultaneously shaped and rendered (a)sexuality invisibility.  
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Two main groups dominated the gay liberation movement; the ‘Gay Liberation Front’ 
and ‘Gay Activists Alliance’. The Gay Activists Alliance was the first political 
organisation in the United States of America to lobby city and state government for Gay 
and Lesbian rights (Schiavi 2011); it will therefore be my focus for the following 
section. Stein (2012: 79) describes the post-1960s gay liberation movement as 
signifying “unprecedented mass mobilization and unparalleled social change”. During 
the decade following the Stonewall riots, socio-political movements became 
increasingly visible. The Gay Liberation Front formed in the United States within the 
months following the 1969 June Stonewall riots, and the Gay Activists Alliance held its 
first meeting in December of the same year. The first meeting of the Gay Liberation 
Front in the United Kingdom was held at the London School of Economics (LSE) in 
1970 alongside the first ‘Pride’ march, which took place in New York.  
 
In the years following the Stonewall riots, activists and groups worked to confront the 
pathologization of homosexuality by the DSM, and set about providing community 
organized social initiatives to gay men and women to challenge discrimination within 
the medical profession (Hall 2008). In addition to the socio-political organisation within 
gay communities there was a proliferation of gay newspapers, sports teams, book stores, 
and community lead helplines or social services, the pressure of which eventually lead 
to homosexuality being declassified as a mental illness in 1973 in the DSM (Hall 2008).  
 
Each of these events marked a major development in the liberation of gendered and 
sexual minorities, but they all have largely been attributed to the Stonewall riots, erasing 
“the long history of pre-Stonewall struggles” (Stein 2012: 80). Taylor (2011: 335) 
writes that “in celebrating new queer presences the absence of ‘others’ must also be 
considered”, and there is an absence of (a)sexuality not only within the social 
movements that have fought for gay liberation, but also within the wider context of the 
increased visibility of marginalized gendered and sexual subjectivities, which I address 
in this subsection through a case study of the Gay Activists Alliance.  
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Utopian activists during the late 1960s had hoped that the liberation of sexuality would 
provide a challenge to global capitalism (Weeks 2007). However, as Foucault (1978) 
highlights, whilst visibility can be argued as necessary for a process of change or 
transgression, visibility also opens up the possibility for assimilation to the normative, 
and activism forces a certain reification of its focus. LGBT+ social movements have 
achieved many arguably ‘positive’ things in Western society (see for example 
McCormack and Anderson 2010). However, the visibility they have achieved has also 
enabled the commodification of homosexuality, and the assimilation of homosexuality 
to heteronormative standards of the ‘good life’ (Ahmed 2010, Duggan 2002). Pride 
events have become increasingly commercialised, and whilst many argue that ‘big’ 
sponsorships can be considered beneficial for the community, others feel marginalized 
and ignored as a result of the ‘celebrations’ of ‘equality’ that for them has yet to be 
achieved (Jeppesen 2010). Weeks (2003: 93) argues that neoliberal capitalism has sped 
up the “dissolution of traditional structures” and “encourage[d] the process of 
‘individualization’”. However, using Ahmed’s (2010) work we can understand gay 
liberation movements and the growing process of ‘individualization’ (Weeks 2003) as 
providing a visibility that enabled an assimilation of homosexuality to the normative 
Western model of capitalist consumption, rather than viewing the proliferation of gay 
and lesbian literature, cinema, newspaper and other commodities as transgressive.  
 
The propagation of literature and other commodities framed as for ‘sexual minorities’ 
can also be understood as having erased (a)sexuality. Asexuality does not conform to 
Western heteronormative sex-centric narratives of a ‘good’ life, but nor does it fit into 
the ‘sexual deviant’ or marginalized stories of homosexuality, bisexuality, or trans 
experiences. (A)sexuality has been rendered invisible through Western societies’ 
understandings of what it means to be (a)sexual, which has hinged on a ‘lack’ of sexual 
desire. A ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of sexual desire in the climate of commercialisation and 
capitalism present in Western societies has positioned the (a)sexual as a bad economic 
subject, through the assumption that a ‘lack’ in sexual desire must also result in a ‘lack’ 
of interest in commodities that are marketed as sexual (Lazzarato 2009, for further 
discussion of the asexual as a bad economic subject see pages 36-37 in Chapter 2).  
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Social and politically organised groups such as the Gay Liberation Front and the Gay 
Activists Alliance frequently used political pamphlets as a means to disseminate their 
work to a wider audience.  One example of these political pamphlets is the Gay 
Activists Alliance (1974) 20 Questions about Homosexuality: A Political Primer (see 
Fig. 4). The pamphlet was primarily aimed at challenging the social abjection of 
homosexuality and the perception that homosexuality was a pathological illness (Gay 
Activists Alliance 1974). The Gay Activists Alliance (1974) pamphlet set out a series of 
4 key demands; the right to their own feelings, the right to love, the right to their own 
bodies, and the right to be persons (see Fig. 4). The pamphlet opens with the statement 
“we as liberated homosexual activists demand the freedom for expression of our dignity 
and value as human being through confrontation with and disbarment of all mechanisms 
which unjustly inhibit us: economic, social, and political” (Gay Activists Alliance 1974: 
2). It also relied heavily on the work of Kinsey (1948, 1953) and Freud (1951) to 
legitimize homosexuality, reinforcing the hetero/homo binary and discounting the 
possibility of anything outside of hetero/homosexuality. In attempting to legitimize 
homosexuality the Gay Activists Alliance (1974) positioned sexuality as something 
universally experienced, binary and static, erasing the possibility of anyone who does 
not experience sexual desire or exhibit sexual behaviour. In relying on the work’s of 
Kinsey (1948, 1953) and Freud (1951) to legitimize homosexuality, experiences of 
(a)sexuality were erased, much in the same way as Kinsey (1948, 1953) excluded ‘X’ 
participants from his scale of sexual behaviour (see pages 48-53 for further discussion 
of Kinsey).  
 





















Figure 4. Gay Activists Alliance (1974) 
 
However, the Gay Activists Alliance was heavily criticised by trans-exclusionary 
radical feminist Morgan (1973), for their low levels of female participation and 
conformity to hegemonic masculine and misogynistic practices. In Blasius and Phelan’s 
(1997) collection of gay liberation stories Morgan (1997: 428) criticizes the Gay 
Activists Alliance remarking “Are we to forgive and forget the Gay Activist Alliance 
dances…at which New York GAA showed stag movies of nude men raping nude 
women?”. However, in the paragraph following this, Morgan (1997) discounts the 
experiences of trans women, describing them as obscene and insulting, calling on others 
to prevent them from participating in activist groups (Blasius and Phelan 1997). 
Morgan’s (1997) statements highlight the fragmentation and tension present within the 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The 
unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed in the Lanchester 
Library Coventry University.
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social movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Social movements are often 
remembered as cohesive and unified, with only ‘positive’ or ‘progressive’ outcomes, 
ignoring the complexities and diversities present within such movements. Cases such as 
Morgan’s (1997) account demonstrate the male dominated make-up of the Gay 
Activists Alliance and other gay liberation movements, but also the tensions present 
within the gay and lesbian community, and their intersections with the feminist 
movement, that all too often served to further marginalize others in their quest for 
‘equality’.  
 
We can understand (a)sexuality as being written out of the history of gay liberation, as a 
strategic response to discourse much like Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) erasure of ‘X’ 
participants. Discourses at the time resulted in a push to legitimize homosexuality 
through medically essentialist notions of sexuality, and the particular uptake of the work 
of Kinsey (1948, 1953) and Freud (1951) led to the propagation of their work being 
viewed as helpful to the deconstruction of homosexual oppression. Whilst the works of 
Kinsey (1948, 1953) and Freud (1951) contributed significantly to the declassification 
of homosexuality as an illness, their adoption by gay liberation movements led to the 
continued propagation and promotion of sexuality as biologically innate, static, and 
something that could be categorized or defined by medicine. The uptake of medical 
works by the gay liberation movement enabled a further marginalization of gendered or 
sexual minorities outside of the hetero/homo binary, and contributed to another instance 
of (a)sexual erasure. In addition, the discourses of individualization encouraged by gay 
liberation movements in the context of capitalist Western society facilitated yet further 
erasure of (a)sexuality, positioning those who did not contribute economically to society 
through the pursuit of sexual pleasure as bad economic subjects.  
4.3 Feminist Movements 	  
I now turn to discuss the relationships between historical feminist movements and 
(a)sexuality. I seek to deconstruct the period of 20th century feminism and the familiar 
narrative Western feminism has told of its history (Hemmings 2005). I choose not to 
limit this case study to a specific decade or ‘wave’ of feminist movement, not in order 
to convolute and homogenise feminist history, but rather to complicate it; as Braidotti 
(1991) highlights it is in many ways “dangerous to propose a purely theoretical 
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representation of this multiple, heterogeneous complex of women’s struggles”. Instead I 
intend to analyse the conflicting interpretations and understandings of feminist 
movements, to highlight the multitude of differences present within it, and revalue “the 
currently sidelined traces” (Hemmings 2005: 131) of asexuality that dominant 
narratives have erased or ignored. I use feminist writings as “a window into one 
moment” of thought (Gerhard 2000: 450). 
 
Hemmings’ work highlights that Western feminism gives a narrative of feminist theory 
and movements that divides the past into clear decades “to provide a narrative of 
relentless progress” (2005: 15); arguing that this narrative “oversimplifies” (2005: 16) 
differences in feminist thought and activism. Braidotti (1997) expands, claiming that the 
dominant narratives of the progress of feminism erase the heterogeneity of individual 
traces and that certain biographies are privileged as a result (Hemmings 2005, Spivak 
1999). I therefore turn to pay particular attention to the ways in which the cohesive and 
linear narrative of feminism that has emerged has contributed to the erasure of 
(a)sexuality. I map the traces of (a)sexuality within 20th century feminism and its 
movements, paying attention to the heterogeneity of the practices, meanings and 
interpretations of both (a)sexuality and feminism.  
 
The shape of feminism has undergone significant transformation throughout the 20th 
century. Suffrage campaigns of the early 1900s subscribed to ‘medical’ models that 
positioned male and female sexuality as ‘naturally’ different, often oppositional and 
static or unchangeable. However, despite these differences, Weeks (1989: 163) writes 
that “what unified all feminists was a desire to ease the burdens of motherhood”, but 
that the ways and means considered necessary to do so were divisive within the 
movement. Some feminists advocated complete chastity in order to resist Western 
notions of the ‘family’ that privileged patriarchy as an institution (see historic articles 
from Densmore 1968, O’Donnell 1968 and Oliver 1912), whilst other feminists called 
for the availability and use of artificial contraception (Weeks 1989). However, the 
ultimate goal remained to allow women control of their own bodies, often homogenised 
under the rubric ‘our bodies, our lives’.  
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Koedt’s (1968) work is largely regarded as the first and most significant challenge to 
the institution of heterosexuality (Gerhard 2000). Koedt drew attention to the ways in 
which female sexuality is “defined… in terms of what pleases men” arguing that 
women were “fed a myth of the liberated woman and her vaginal orgasm, an orgasm 
which in fact does not exist” (1968: 11). Koedt (1968) did not align clitoral orgasm with 
a specific sexual identity, but rather a form of female sexuality that transcended socially 
assigned terms. In doing so Koedt’s (1968) work marked a major break in Western 
sexual and feminist thinking, in a context where psychiatric, physiological and medical 
works of Kinsey (1948, 1953), Freud (1914) and Krafft-Ebing (1886) were still 
privileged and drawn on to legitimise sexual difference (Gerhard 2000). Koedt’s (1968) 
work pursues the clitoral orgasm as a tool harnessing emancipatory power to challenge 
patriarchal understandings of female sexuality. In contrast, Oliver (1912) argued that the 
only way women could avoid conforming to patriarchal norms of sexuality was to take 
a complete vow of chastity, in order that women avoided becoming “slaves” (1912: 
252) to their “lower appetites” (1912: 252) in the same way that men had. However, 
both Koedt’s (1968) and Oliver’s (1912) arguments are flawed in the sense that they 
both serve to marginalise others. Koedt (1968) dismisses the idea that there may be 
women who do not wish to orgasm or who do not find clitoral stimulation pleasurable, 
whilst Oliver stigmatizes women who have “lower appetites” (1912: 252).  
 
The struggle between understanding the body as a site of socio-political power and at 
the same time understanding the body as a source of pleasure and physical experience 
“has represented a central dilemma in the feminist movements of the past 40 years” 
(Fahs 2010: 446). Milks (2014) has argued that the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 
1970s, led by feminists and gay activists, ignored asexual women because it assumed 
they were repressed. The rejection of chastity or non-orgasmic sex by certain ‘sex 
positive’ feminists led to the advocacy of better contraceptive choices and the assertion 
of clitoral orgasm and sexual pleasure as an entitlement. However, those who did not 
wish to claim their ‘entitlement’ to sexual pleasure or clitoral orgasm were ‘othered’ by 
differing feminist sects that understood the refusal to uptake the demand for clitoral 
orgasm as ‘sex negative’. In contrast some feminist schools of thought claimed 
(a)sexual practices, or celibacy, as a radical refusal of the cultural context of sexual 
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liberation that some feminists argued promoted women’s sexual availability (Przybylo 
and Cooper 2014).  
 
Cell 16, a militant feminist organisation most active during the late 1960s and 1970s, 
prescribed a programme of celibacy and self-defence to women (Echols 1989). Cell 16 
relied on essentialist binary explanations of gender as biologically innate and ‘naturally’ 
different to discourage homosexuality, claiming it was prevalent within feminist 
organisations as a response to the pervasiveness of heterosexuality, but that it was only 
a ‘personal’ solution to a societal problem (Echols 1989). In the first of Cell 16’s series 
of No More Fun and Games: A Journal of Female Liberation publications Densmore 
(1968: NP) argued that the major problem with liberation was “a supposed ‘need’ for 
sex”. Densmore (1968: NP) went on to underline that “sex is not essential to life, as 
eating is. Some people go through their whole lives without engaging in it at all, 
including fine, warm, happy people”. Parallels can be drawn between Densmore’s 
(1968) description of people who go through life without having sex, and Krafft-
Ebing’s (1886) patients’ K. and W. who report no discomfort at their lack of sexual 
interest and live seemingly happy lives (see pages 45-46 for a discussion of Krafft-
Ebing’s (1886) patients).  
 
However, Densmore (1968: NP) also goes on to explain, “We are programmed to crave 
sex. It sells consumer goods. It gives a lift and promises a spark of individual self-
assertion in a dull and routinized world”. Here Densmore (1968) slips into essentialist 
notions that sexual desire is innate and natural. On one level Densmore’s (1968) 
argument implies that not engaging in sex is revolutionary and politically emancipating, 
through demonstrating a rejection of capitalist consumption and a refusal of masculine 
defined sexual norms. Yet at the same time Densmore simultaneously erases the 
possibility of (a)sexuality, through the assertion that “We are programmed to crave sex” 
(1968: NP), so that not engaging in sex is only radical, revolutionary or politically 
emancipating if you abstain from sex by making a conscious choice to repress sexual 
‘cravings’. The trace of (a)sexuality can be understood as being an absent presence in 
the work of Densmore (1968), who identifies the possibility of living a “fine” life 
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without sex, but also simultaneously erases the possibility of a genuine lack of interest 
in sex.  
 
Fahs (2010) argues that the uptake of asexuality in feminist debate could become a 
useful tool to deconstruct the binary of sex positive and sex negative feminists debates. 
For Fahs (2010) ‘sex positive’ feminist movements used the assertion of sexual pleasure 
as a right, to construct sexual ‘freedom’ as synonymous with freedom to have more 
sexual activity or partners, and experience more physical pleasure. The emphasis on 
these forms of sexual ‘freedom’ has left (a)sexuality noticeably absent from the 
dominant narratives of the ‘sexual revolution’ (Fahs 2010, Milks 2014, Przybylo and 
Cooper 2014). The assumption that sexual liberation relied on having more pleasurable 
and non-heteropenetrative/normative sex, erased the experiences of those who felt a 
‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of sexual desire or a desire for sexual pleasure, and those that did not 
find sex pleasurable. However, as demonstrated through articles published by Cell 16 
(Densmore 1968, O’Donnell 1968, Oliver 1912) ‘sex negative’ organizations also 
instigated an erasure of asexuality, through the assumption that celibacy only held 
political potential for those that experienced and then repressed sexual desires.  
 
This subsection has discussed Przybylo and Cooper’s (2014) reading of feminist 
celibacy as a form of asexuality, and Fahs (2010) contrasting call to embrace asexuality 
as a way to deconstruct the sex positive/negative dichotomy. I have used Foucault’s 
(1972: 211) understanding that “discourse is not life: its time is not your time”, to 
describe the ways in which the singular is always privileged by history despite multiple 
meanings. In line with Foucault’s (1972) thinking I have not sought to distinguish 
whether or not examples of celibate feminist movements can be read as asexual. I have 
instead sought to identify the absent presence of the trace of asexuality within feminist 
movements of the 20th century. Cell 16, for example, encouraged an abstinence from all 
sexual activity, and their written work can be read as harbouring evidence of the erasure 
of (a)sexuality within ‘sex negative’ movements in a way which Fahs (2010) ignores. In 
publications (see Densmore 1968, O’Donnell 1968) Cell 16 also imply that there is no 
healthy possibility of experiencing little interest or desire for sex. I therefore read the 
publications and writings of Cell 16, Densmore (1968), Koedt (1968), Oliver (1912), 
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and O’Donnell (1968) as ‘props’ (Plummer 1995) containing the absent presence of 
(a)sexuality (Derrida 1976) that has remained missing from the liberation stories we tell. 
These traces of asexuality present within feminist movements of the 20th century have 
functioned to shape contemporary understandings of asexuality, which I shall now 
address through a case study of the Asexuality Visibility and Education Network 
(AVEN).  
4.4 The Asexuality Visibility and Education Network	  
In the following subsection I now turn to explore the Asexuality Visibility and 
Education Network (AVEN) and its definition of contemporary asexuality. I seek to 
trace the establishing moments of AVEN, and the ways in which historic traces of 
(a)sexuality have haunted and shaped contemporary understandings of asexuality. In the 
following subsection I will be examining the history of the AVEN, exploring the ways 
in which it was established, and how the AVEN has shaped the face of contemporary 
asexuality. I draw further attention to the complexities present within the asexual 
community that make asexuality increasingly difficult to define. 
 
American activist David Jay founded the AVEN in 2001 as an internally hosted site at 
Wesleyan University, originally established after Jay had struggled in defining his own 
identity due to lack of available resources. During the turn of the 21st century the 
internet was fast expanding and, within the same year Jay founded the AVEN, 
Wikipedia was also founded, Apple launched iTunes, and 54% of U.S. households had 
Internet access (U.S. Department of Commerce 2004). Mosbergen (2013) writes, “at the 
time, asexuality, beyond a purely biological definition was almost completely unheard 
of… to most of the world”. Jay has spoken to press on multiple occasions (see 
Mosbergen 2013, Sohn 2005) about his rational behind the community and the founding 
of the AVEN commenting he knew “that asexual people have been looking for each 
other for a long time, but it wasn’t until the Internet that we found each other” 
(Mosbergen 2013: NP).   
 
One of the first written traces of Asexuality online is highlighted both in Jay’s accounts 
of AVEN’s beginnings and in Hinderliter’s (2009) history of definition; ‘My Life as an 
Amoeba’ (O’Reilly 1997). Hinderliter (2009) noted that throughout the 90’s people 
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would post about something that resembled asexuality on message boards, but these 
platforms did not offer people space to respond. However, O’Reilly’s (1997) article, 
posted to the now non-existent StarNet Dispatches, provided the first notable platform 
for asexual discussion online. The article called for “the world to know that we are out 
there” (O’Reilly 1997: NP). StarNet Dispatches had space for comments, and ‘My Life 
as an Amoeba’ prompted response from asexuals around the world (although most 
likely to be U.S. or U.K. based) calling for a community and space to interact.  
 
In response to ‘My Life as an Amoeba’ the most significant pre-public-AVEN asexual 
community was established as a Yahoo! group, known as ‘Haven for the Human 
Amobea’ (HHA) in 2001 (Hinderliter 2009). The group remained inactive for its first 
six months of operation, despite a steadily growing membership, with its first discussion 
not being instigated until the following year when the group’s creator queried people 
joining without saying anything. From this point on discussion was sporadic until 
around July 2007 when people began posting more regularly. HHA still exists, although 
is considerably less active today. According to Hinderliter (2009) a number of other 
early asexual community sites that have since ceased to exist are still accessible as static 
pages via the Internet Archive, however, due to the inconsistency of language at the 
time and their often obscure names these sites are difficult to find without explicit prior 
knowledge of their existence, in this sense early asexual community sites can be 
considered a trace of themselves.  
 
AVEN was made public and first established its forums in 2002, and slowly began its 
rise to prominence as the largest asexual community online. Hinderliter (2009) puts 
forward a number of arguments as to why AVEN overtook its competitors in popularity, 
including; its domain name being memorable (asexuality.org), its superior design, and 
the forums enabling multiple conversations to occur simultaneously. However, it is 
arguable that the most significant factor could be AVEN’s external hosting. Previous 
groups and communities were reliant on existing sites for hosting, including the Yahoo! 
group HHA, and the Live Journal (LJ) community, which the AVEN had close links 
with. Externally hosting the AVEN enabled them to climb up Google’s search results, 
making them more easily findable by those outside of the community.  
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Another aspect of AVEN’s lasting popularity in the asexual community is its direction. 
Where other platforms primary focus was to encourage conversation, AVEN 
encouraged members to engage with each other and their own wider communities 
outside of the Internet. The current incarnation of AVEN claims to have two main 
objectives; to facilitate public acceptance and discussion of asexuality, and to enable to 
growth of the asexual community (The Asexuality Visibility and Education Network 
2015). Since beginning its growth has been substantial and it now boasts over 70,000 
members from across the world, making it the largest recorded asexual community (The 
Asexuality Visibility and Education Network 2015). The site attempts to serve as an 
informational resource for those who identify as asexual, are questioning their 
a/sexuality or for family and friends of asexual identified people. The AVEN (The 
Asexuality Visibility and Education Network 2015) encourages members to “regularly 
engage in visibility projects” including “distributing information pamphlets, leading 
workshops, arranging local meet-ups and speaking to interested press”.  
 
Hinderliter (2011) highlights that AVEN’s definition of asexuality marks asexuality as 
intrinsic and as something that is defined independently of an individual’s own identity. 
Throughout AVEN’s ‘HOME’, ‘ABOUT AVEN’ and ‘ABOUT ASEXUALITY’ pages 
there is a continual distancing of asexuality from celibacy. The first paragraph of the 
‘ABOUT ASEXUALITY: Overview’ pages reads:  
 
“An asexual is someone who does not experience sexual attraction. Unlike 
celibacy, which people choose, asexuality is an intrinsic part of who we are. 
Asexuality does not make our lives any worse or any better, we just face a 
different set of challenges than most sexual people. There is considerable 
diversity among the asexual community; each asexual person experiences things 
like relationships, attraction, and arousal somewhat differently. Asexuality is 
just beginning to be the subject of scientific research”. (The Asexuality 
Visibility and Education Network 2015) 
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The excerpt above from AVEN (2015) defines celibacy as behavioural and a ‘choice’; 
marking celibacy as in complete contrast to asexuality, which is defined as “intrinsic”. 
This definition is not a new addition or even an evolution: Hinderliter (2009) notes 
AVEN’s definition of asexuality has remained static since it first went public. There 
have been a number of debates on the definition both within and outside the forums 
hosted by AVEN, however, Hinterliter (2009: NP) notes “most people didn’t seem to 
want to change the definition because they recognised that any definition” would “run 
into similar problems” because “there is no perfect definition of asexuality”. David 
Jay’s own argument has been that AVEN’s public definition is intended for people 
outside of the asexual community and that within the asexual community the accepted 
definition is “anyone who calls themself asexual” (Hinderliter 2009: NP). However, 
through opposing the relationship between celibacy and asexuality so strongly the 
AVEN (2015) marks asexuality as something that cannot be chosen and is inherently 
fixed. Defining asexuality as “intrinsic” and inherent is problematic not only because so 
much of the AVEN’s (2015) own community reject this understanding, but also because 
such a definition positions asexuality as a fixed and static orientation; privileged over 
identity. Though as Hinderliter (2009) recounts there have been a number of discussions 
of definition within AVEN community and given the public-facing nature of AVEN’s 
(2015) definition of asexuality, and the length of time it has remained unchanged it 
could be considered that AVEN’s (2015) definition has in fact shaped the community, 
rather than the community shaping the definition in the way Jay has argued (Hinderliter 
2009, Mosbergen 2013, Sohn 2005). 
 
In defining asexuality, and therefore the contemporary asexual community, AVEN 
(2015) has drawn on ‘scientific’ and ‘medical’ research in an attempt to legitimise 
asexuality as a sexual orientation. Parallels can be drawn here between AVEN’s (2015) 
reliance on ‘scientific’ research to legitimise asexuality and the Gay Activists Alliance 
who drew on the work of Kinsey (1948, 1953) and Freud (1951) in an attempt to 
legitimize homosexuality in the 1970s (see pages 68-70).  Whilst the quest for 
legitimacy can be understood as assimilation to Western normative understandings of 
sexuality, the lived experiences of those who seek legal recognition for their identity 
must not be disregarded. AVEN (2015) also argue that legal recognition and legal 
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legitimacy of asexuality could lead more people to ‘discover’ an asexual identity, 
because it has remained relatively invisible in Western socio-cultural contexts that 
favour heterosexuality.  
 
However, on the same ‘ABOUT ASEXUALITY: Overview’ page AVEN (2015) 
positions asexuality as an identity category by arguing “If at any point someone finds 
the word asexual useful to describe themselves, we encourage them to use it for as long 
as it makes sense to do so”. Through its definitions of asexuality AVEN (2015) is in 
constant contradiction and tension with itself, by attempting to distance behaviour from 
identity. Hinderliter (2011) argues that distancing behaviour from identity is in fact 
impossible as well as unhelpful and instead we should be concerned with how the two 
interconnect and relate.  
 
Contemporary asexuality as an identity is self-understanding and cannot be separated 
from its current historical social contexts. We can understand historic medical practices 
(discussed in Chapter 2, see pages 23-34) as haunting contemporary understandings of 
asexuality outside of medicine. Historical understandings of hysteria have persisted to 
haunt both contemporary medical practices associated with an ‘absence’ or ‘lack’ of 
sexual desire, and in turn the contemporary asexuality community on AVEN. Gordon 
(2008, 2011) conceptualises haunting as a form of disappearance from recognition. 
Using Gordon’s (2008, 2011) conceptualisations of haunting, we can consider the 
haunting of contemporary medicine by hysteria as erasing asexuality from recognition. 
The current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) includes two 
diagnoses that closely parallel the definitions of asexuality given by the Asexuality 
Visibility and Education Network (The Asexuality Visibility and Education Network 
2015, American Psychiatric Association 2013), but also include sub-clauses in their 
diagnostic criteria to prevent a diagnosis being made if the individual self-identifies as 
asexual (see pages 53-59 in Chapter 3 for further discussion of asexuality and the 
DSM). Asexuality, whilst being explicitly mentioned, is simultaneously delegitimized 
by the DSM’s refusal to diagnose or ‘treat’ those who identify as asexual. This is not to 
say that asexuality should be or requires treatment, rather that asexuality becomes an 
absent presence that instead persists to both haunt and be haunted by concealed histories 
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(Kuntsman 2011). Biological essentialism, psychiatry, heteronormativity and Western 
sex-centrism, upheld by medicine, have determined that asexuality should be 
understood as a biologically innate ‘lack’ or an ‘absence’ of what is considered 
‘normative’. Within AVEN asexuality is presented as “intrinsic”, and whilst AVEN also 
acknowledges asexuality is not a fixed or stable identity for everyone, that argument is 
not presented until much further down their definition page, creating a hierarchy of 
asexuality where biologically essentialist notions of orientation are privileged over 
identity. 
 
Przybylo and Cooper (2014) have understood the AVEN (2015) as a public archive and 
‘face’ of asexuality, whilst they highlight the biologically essentialist definitions of 
asexuality given by the AVEN they also highlight the space created for more diverse 
and individually bound definitions of asexuality through the forums attached to the 
AVEN. Ultimately though, Przybylo and Cooper (2014) argue that asexuality has 
narrowed in definition since the rise of the web and that asexual community platforms 
such as the AVEN have contributed to the narrowing of definition. There are also 
considerable problems with the majority of existing research on asexual identity and 
definition; as the majority of academic research has relied on participants from the 
AVEN subjects can only be self-identified asexuals, ignoring those who may practice 
(a)sexuality but haven’t yet come to an asexual identity yet.  
 
In conclusion to this subsection, whilst AVEN has contributed significantly to an 
increased visibility of asexuality, this visibility has only reached certain sections of 
society; largely white and largely Western. The shape of AVEN has not only been 
determined by historical traces of (a)sexuality located by this thesis within the works of 
Kinsey (1948, 1953), Krafft-Ebing (1886), Freud (1951), but is also haunted by the 
traces of liberation movements including the Gay Activists Alliance (1974) and 
Feminist movements (see pages 66-70 for discussion of Gay Activists Alliance and 70-
75 for discussion of asexual erasure in Feminist movements). Through the uptake of 
these traces AVEN has shaped the identifiable definition of contemporary asexuality, 
and in turn its own community.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the politicization assemblage has facilitated the uptake of 
traces of medical and psychological understandings of (a)sexuality as a means to 
legitimize its existence. The attention paid to the ways in which certain forms of 
visibility have resulted in an assimilation of liberation movements to ‘normative’ 
Western standards has again underlined how asexuality has been erased by Western 
society. I have again emphasised how a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of sexual desire in capitalist 
societies has rendered the asexual as a ‘bad economic subject’, through the assumption 
that a ‘lack’ of desire to consume sex is synonymous with a ‘lack’ of desire to consumer 
commodities marketed as sexual. Through an exploration of the diversity and 
heterogeneity of liberation histories that are often presented as linear and homogeneous 
narratives, I have illuminated the traces of (a)sexuality that have shaped the 
contemporary online community AVEN (2015). In paying attention to the complexity 
of liberation histories I have understood the texts analysed as ‘props’ (Plummer 1995), 
which contain the absent presence of traces of asexuality. I have deliberately avoided 
limiting the case studies drawn on to a specific decade, in order to complicate 
understandings of Western liberation histories. In doing so I have illuminated “currently 
sidelined traces” (Hemmings 2005: 131), to underline the ways in which their erasure 
persists to haunt contemporary asexuality and dominant understandings of what 
asexuality is.  
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Conclusion	  
In conclusion, this thesis has argued that instances of asexuality precede the Internet, 
and that its existence has instead been erased through the series of complex and multi-
faceted discourses that have spanned recent history. I have traced the existence of 
asexuality in a Western context through the late 19th century up to contemporary 
society, understanding asexuality as an absent presence within Western historical 
documents. I have examined the interconnections of medicalization, pathologization and 
politicization assemblages that have erased asexuality. I have come to understand the 
erasure of asexuality as a product of capitalist Western society, where asexuals have 
been framed as ‘bad economic subjects’ (Lazzarato 2009) through their refusal to 
consume sex in normative ways.  
 
I have argued the importance of listening to silences when researching a subject that is 
claimed to be culturally or socially invisible, drawing on the work of Mazzei (2007), 
Dyer (1997) and Black (2011). The research has examined how socially and culturally 
invisible subjects can become haunted by their unspoken or erased histories through the 
work of Cvetkovich (2003) and Gordon (2011, 2008). In creating a methodological 
framework for researching asexuality I have sought to combat the ontological 
complications of researching an invisible subject, which is also understood to exist only 
through a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of something, through drawing on the work of Derrida 
(1976). Through careful genealogical enquiry I have traced asexuality via a series of 
complex and heterogeneous assemblages, arguing for an embracement of what 
asexuality can do, rather than what it is or is not (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, Fox 
2012). In understanding asexuality as a trace of a node within the assemblages of 
medicalization, pathologization and politicization I have enabled new understandings of 
asexuality as something with an agency of its own, in constant flux and non-definable. 
 
Through an account of the medicalization assemblage using case studies of female 
‘hysteria’ and ‘frigidity’, and the rise of Viagra, I have examined the ways in which sex 
has become framed as a necessity in Western society. I have analysed the ways in which 
discourses surrounding ‘normative’ sexuality positioned an ‘absence’ or ‘lack’ of sexual 
desire as in need of medical intervention and treatment (Maines 1999). Through 
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Foucault’s (1989) work surrounding the medical gaze, I have explored how the 
privileging of the body in medicine enforced the notion that ‘treatments’ should work 
on the ‘surface’ ignoring complexities and individual differences in identity, behaviour 
and experience. I have explored the ways in which developments in ‘science’ and a shift 
away from religion in line with enlightenment thinking at the time facilitated the 
implementation and marketing of Viagra. I draw attention to how medical discourses 
serve to regulate and control society, and regulate (a)sexuality through its erasure 
(Foucault 1978). The exploration of the medicalization assemblage has enabled an 
understanding of asexuality’s erasure as “meaning full” (Mazzei 2007: 29); as opening 
up possibilities to transgress Western hierarchies of relationships that privilege the 
sexual (Przybylo 2011).   
 
In the pathologization chapter I have highlighted the ways that asexuality was rendered 
invisible through the psyche. In drawing on the works of Krafft-Ebing (1886) and 
Kinsey (1948, 1953) I have established the ways in which a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of 
sexual desire was legitimized as a psychological disorder. I have mapped the evolution 
of the diagnosis and categorization of psychological ‘disorders’ surrounding a ‘lack’ or 
‘absence’ of sexual desire through the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, which has 
refused to legitimize asexuality despite naming it. Through the pathologization 
assemblage I have considered the ways in which (a)sexuality has become a prisoner of 
heteronormativity, and the institutions, histories and disciplinary technologies which 
uphold it by silencing or pathologizing everything outside of (hetero)penetrative sex. I 
have drawn attention to the ways (a)sexuality can be re-presented through Black’s 
(2011) work, so that the haunting of (a)sexuality by psychiatry can be understood as 
transformative. Rather than understanding asexuality through a ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ I 
instead present the traces of asexuality as harnessing transgressive potential through 
their shaping of the future.  
 
I have also explored asexuality within the politicization assemblage. Using the work of 
Plummer (1995) and Hemmings (2005) I have drawn attention to the ways in which we 
retell liberation stories and how these retellings have shaped social movements. I have 
examined how the gay liberation movement and feminist movements have further 
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erased asexuality through their activisms, whilst creating sciences.  I have drawn on the 
work of Foucault (1972) to underline the privileging of the singular histories despite 
their complexities. An analysis of the gay liberation movement has illuminated 
asexuality’s erasure as a strategic response to discourses at the time. I have underlined 
the ways that medical works were drawn on to legitimize homosexuality, and how the 
uptake of Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) works further marginalized gendered and sexual 
minorities outside of the hetero/homo binary. Through an exploration 20th century 
feminist movements I understand feminist texts as ‘props’ (Plummer 1995) that contain 
the absent presence of the trace of asexuality (Derrida 1976). I have traced the ways in 
which these ‘props’ have contributed to the shape of contemporary asexuality (Plummer 
1995).   
 
Finally I have underlined the ways in which the assemblages of medicalization, 
pathologization and politicization have shaped contemporary asexual movements, and 
the online community on the Asexuality Visibility and Education Network. I have 
highlighted the complexity of asexuality, and its historical traces prior to the Internet. 
This work has understood asexuality in new ways, outside of medical frameworks that 
have positioned asexuality as an innate ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of sexual desire, and beyond 
the confines of the online community AVEN. My methodological framework has 
presented a new way of researching socially or culturally invisible objects, and enabled 
an understanding of asexuality as multi-faceted, complex and un-definable. In doing so, 
the research provides groundwork for future studies on invisibility, asexuality and other 
‘new’ sexual subjectivities that are largely understood as products of contemporary 
mediated society.   
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